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ALLOWING NEW TECHNOLOGY TO ERODE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS: A FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO
NON-CONSENSUAL DNA TESTING OF PRISONERS
Jones v. Murray (1992)
I. INMODUCTON
Officials charged with enforcing the criminal laws need effective
ways to identify suspects.' Forensic DNA testing provides a powerful
new tool with which to do so. 2 DNA is the "basic material of heredity"
that determines the biological characteristics of the individual. 3 In crim-
inal investigations, DNA testing enables law enforcement officials to
compare test results from a suspect's DNA with those from DNA de-
tected in evidence, such as blood-stained clothing found at a crime
1. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7. 1, at
353 (2d ed. 1992) ("[Tihe identification problem is a serious one and has long
existed."). As early as the turn of the century, a portion of the law of evidence
was devoted to rules of identification. See GEORGE E. HARRIS, A TREATISE ON
THE LAw OF IDENTIFICATION 1 (Albany, H.B. Parsons 1892) (asserting that law of
identification was "a question of growing importance and one that is daily
before the courts").
2. LORNE T. KIRBY, DNA FINGERPRINTING: AN INTRODUCTION XV (1990)
("[DNA identification] technology could be the greatest single advance in the
search for truth, conviction of the guilty, and acquittal of the innocent since the
advent of cross-examination." citing People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644
(Albany County Ct. 1988), aff'd, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), a ffd,
No. 18, 1994 WL 99513 (N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994)); see U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 7
(1990) [hereinafter GENETIC WITNESS] ("Forensic DNA analysis can provide
more definitive and objective evidence to ascertain the innocence or guilt of an
individual [than] ... subjective evidence such as eyewitness testimony."); see also
William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 51-52 (1989) ("Compared to tradi-
tional genetic [identification] tests .... DNA typing looks like a panacea.");
Debra C. Moss, DNA - The New Fingerprints, A.B.A.J., May 1, 1988, at 66 ("DNA
typing could revolutionize law enforcement."); Tighten Rules for DNA Printing,
NEWSDAY, June 14, 1992, sec. Currents, at 27 (calling DNA testing "a revolution-
ary new tool for exposing the guilty and exonerating the innocent"); cf. NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, 27-28
(1992) [hereinafter DNA TECHNOLOGY] (noting that in principle DNA testing
may be perfected into method of absolute identification).
3. JoAnn M. Longobardi, DNA Fingerprinting and the Need for a National Data
Base, 17 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 323, 325-26 (1989) (citingJ. BAKER & G. ALLEN, THE
STUDY OF BIOLOGY 441-42 (4th ed. 1982)); see also People v. Wesley, 533
N.Y.S.2d 643, 644-48 (Albany County Ct. 1988) (providing "A Genetic and Bio-
logical Primer" to explain basics of genetics and cellular biology as background
for understanding DNA testing), af'd, 589 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), aFd,
No. 18, 1994 WL 99513 (N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994). For further discussion of the
basic scientific consensus about DNA, see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying
text.
(1617)
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scene. A match between the results from the two tested samples consti-
tutes evidence that the suspect committed the crime.4 One method for
law enforcement officials to obtain a suspect's blood for DNA testing is
to secure a search warrant.5 In addition, a number of states have cre-
ated databases of DNA test results from persons convicted of particular
crimes for later comparison with test results from DNA found in crime
scene evidence.8 When state authorities take blood samples from incar-
4. See, e.g., Colorado v. Lindsey, No. 90-CA0556, 1993 WL 2650, at *1
(Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1993). In Lindsey, the court described the DNA testing
and identification at issue in a rape and burglary case:
Blood samples from defendant and the two victims, together with vagi-
nal swabs taken from the two victims shortly after the assaults, were
sent to Cellmark Diagnostic Corporation. Cellmark subsequently re-
ported that the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) from known blood of thedefendant matched the DNA "fingerprint" of the samples obtained
from the vaginal swabs of the two victims and a semen stain sample
from the bedsheet recovered after the January incident.
Id This "match" was admitted as evidence that the defendant was the source of
the semen and therefore the perpetrator of the crime. Id. at *3 (noting that all
other evidence against defendant was circumstantial); see United States v.
Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 630 (D.C. 1992) ("The DNA evidence was thus intended
to corroborate the complainant's expected identification of Porter as her assail-
ant and to demonstrate that it was extremely improbable that someone other
than Porter had committed the crime.").
5. See State v. Bruno, 424 S.E.2d 440, 443 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (police
obtained search warrant to "complete[] 'a standard suspect evidence collection
kit,' " including blood sample, from man suspected of burglary and rape), review
demied, 428 S.E.2d 185 (N.C. 1993). But see State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 504
(Wash. 1993) (suspected rapist consented to taking of blood sample for DNA
testing).
6. As of the writing of this Note, fourteen states have authorized the crea-
tion of databases of DNA profiles. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-201(5)(g)(I)
(West Supp. 1992) (making chemical testing for genetic markers condition of
parole after conviction of sexual assault); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West
Supp. 1992) (subjecting blood of sex offenders to DNA analysis for "genetic
markers and characteristics for the purpose of individual identification"); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (Supp. 1992) (requiring DNA analysis of blood of persons
convicted of certain sex offenses and storage of profile in database); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-4-3 (Supp. 1992) (authorizing analysis of blood from
sexual offenders and institutionalized "sexually dangerous person[s]" and "cat-
egoriz[ation] into genetic marker groupings"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.10 (West
1989) (conditioning parole of some offenders on submission of blood sample for
DNA analysis); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.535 (West 1992) (authorizing testing
sex offenders for genetic markers in blood); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.155
(West Supp. 1992) (requiring DNA analysis of blood of sex offenders); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 650.050, .055 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (authorizing collection of
blood samples from felons convicted for violent or sex offenses for DNA profil-
ing system); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.111 (Michie Supp. 1991) (authorizing
testing blood of sex offenders for genetic markers); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74,
§ 150.2, tit. 57, § 584 (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing State Bureau of Investiga-
tion to maintain database of DNA profiles and authorizing Department of Cor-
rections to require sex offenders to provide blood sample for DNA analysis);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23-5-14 to -15 (Supp. 1992) (authorizing genetic
marker grouping analysis of blood of convicted sex offenders and suspects of sex
offenses taken into custody); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (Supp. 1992) (au-
1618 [V/ol. 38: p. 1617
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cerated felons without their consent in order to create these databases, a
question arises as to whether the testing violates Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches. 7
In Jones v. Murray8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit became the first appellate court to address this question. 9
In Jones, the court held that a Virginia statute authorizing non-consen-
sual DNA testing of incarcerated felons10 did not violate the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution." The Jones court con-
thorizing collection of biological specimens from sex offenders for DNA analysis
and requiring collection as condition of release from imprisonment); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie Supp. 1993) (requiring blood sample for DNA analy-
sis upon felony conviction); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.43.754 (West Supp.
1992) (requiring blood samples from violent felons and felony sex offenders for
"DNA identification analysis"); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.171-178
(West Supp. 1992) (DNA Identification Profiling System Act passed but effect
conditioned on fully enacted funding).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.").
The United States Supreme Court has held that a blood test is a search under
the Fourth Amendment; as such, the state must demonstrate its reasonableness.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966).
8. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472
(1992).
9. Id. at 306. For a detailed discussion of the reasoning ofJones, see infra
notes 165-210 and accompanying text.
10. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-310.2 to .7 (Michie Supp. 1993). The statute
states, in pertinent part:
Every person convicted of a felony on or after July 1, 1990, and every
person convicted of [felony criminal sexual assault] . . . who was incar-
cerated onJuly 1, 1989, shall have a sample of his blood taken for DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis to determine identification characteris-
tics specific to the person .... The identification characteristics of the
profile resulting from the DNA analysis shall be stored and maintained
... in a DNA data bank and shall be made available only as provided in
§ 19.2-310.5.
Id. § 19.2-310.2.
Subsequent subsections of the statute outline DNA analysis and database
procedures including: 1) withdrawal of the blood sample, 2) conducting the
DNA analysis on the sample, 3) maintenance of the resulting database and 4)
exchanging information on request of law enforcement officials. Id. § 19.2-
310.3 to .5. The statute also provides penalties for unauthorized use of the
database samples and information, and a procedure for expungement of a DNA
profile if the felony conviction, which provided the basis for including the infor-
mation, is reversed and the case dismissed. Id. § 19.2-310.6 to .7.
11. Jones, 962 F.2d at 310. For a detailed discussion of the reasoning of the
majority and the points of departure of the dissent, see infa notes 165-210. In
Jones, six prisoner-plaintiffs brought an action challenging the constitutionality
of the Virginia compulsory DNA testing statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jones,
962 F.2d at 305. The prisoner-plaintiffs brought the action against the Director
of the Virginia Department of Corrections and the Director of the Bureau of
Forensic Science. Id. They alleged that the blood tests authorized by the statute
constituted unreasonable searches prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and
that the statute operated as an ex post facto law in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. On cross motions for summary judgment, the United States
3
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cluded that the Fourth Amendment offers little or no protection to the
privacy interests of prisoners and that even if such interests are pro-
tected, state interests in solving future crimes outweigh the minor intru-
sion represented by taking blood samples for DNA analysis.' 2
In order to provide a background for analyzing the constitutionality
of non-consensual DNA testing, this Note first sets forth the basic
Fourth Amendment principles relevant to the analysis.' 3 After placing
blood tests as searches in Fourth Amendment context, 14 this Note re-
views two relevant lines of United States Supreme Court precedent in-
terpreting the Fourth Amendment: cases determining the level of
Fourth Amendment protection prisoners retain while incarcerated,' 5
and cases addressing the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
of searches conducted without individualized suspicion.1 6 As a model,
this Note also discusses one case that applied the Fourth Amendment
framework provided by these two lines of cases to non-consensual
blood-testing of prisoners.1 7 Next, this Note examines how the technol-
ogy, reliability and admissibility of DNA testing may alter this Fourth
District Court for the Western District of Virginia upheld the law and the pris-
oner.plaintiffs appealed. Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Va. 1991), a Jd
in part, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the greater part of the district court's ruling. Jones, 962 F.2d at 310- 1.
The Fourth Circuit held that the language in the statute that purported to make
it apply irrespective of the Virginia mandatory parole statute had the effect of an
unconstitutional ex post facto law. Id. at 311. As to this conclusion there was no
dissent. Id. (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. Jones, 962 F.2d at 310-11. TheJones court summarized its holding in the
following terms:
Considering the inmates' questionable claim of privacy to protect their
identification and the minimal intrusion resulting from taking a small
sample of blood, the Commonwealth's interest in combatting and de-
terring felony recidivism justifies the involuntary taking of the sample
and the creation of the DNA database as reasonable in the context of
the Fourth Amendment.
Id. For a detailed discussion of the majority's reasoning and the dissent's points
of departure, see infra notes 165-210 and accompanying text.
13. For the complete discussion of Fourth Amendment cases bearing on
the constitutionality of non-consensual blood tests, see infra notes 20-85 and
accompanying text.
14. For a complete discussion of the status of blood tests as Fourth Amend-
ment searches, see infra notes 20-85 and accompanying text. In addition, for
another student perspective on the place ofJones v. Murray in the context of the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see Michael W. Kier, Com-
ment, Jones v. Murray: Allowing the Government to Get Blood From a Stone, 42 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 635 (1992).
15. For a full discussion of the prisoners' rights cases, see infra notes 38-53
and accompanying text.
16. For a detailed discussion of the suspicionless search cases, see infra
notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
17. For a complete discussion of this case, Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188,
1194-97 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990), see infra notes 77-85
and accompanying text.
1620 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
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Amendment framework.' 8 Finally, this Note analyzes the Jones court's
resolution of the constitutionality of non-consensual blood testing of
prisoners for DNA identification and concludes that the rule set forth in
Jones unduly curtails the privacy rights of non-violent felons.' 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. United States Supreme Court Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Leading Up
to Jones
1. Blood Testing in a Fourth Amendment Context
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
"the people" against unreasonable searches and seizures by the govern-
ment.20 In Katz v. United States,2 1 the United States Supreme Court de-
fined a "search" for the purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis as a
governmental intrusion into an area where an individual has a "reason-
able expectation of privacy."122 Accordingly, in every Fourth Amend-
ment case, the interest of the government must be balanced against the
competing interest of the individual. 23 In 1966, the Supreme Court first
examined these interests in the context of a non-consensual blood test
18. The consideration of DNA testing in this Note consists of four sections:
I) the scientific theory and procedures underlying DNA analysis, 2) the proce-
dural sources of error in DNA testing, 3) the debate regarding the statistical
underpinnings of DNA identification evidence and 4) the admissibility of DNA
identification evidence once obtained. For a description of forensic DNA testing
procedures, see infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
laboratory competence issues, see infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the debate regarding the statistical issues effecting the relia-
bility of DNA test results, see infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the different standards used by various courts in deciding the ad-
missibility of DNA identification evidence, see infra notes 121-42 and accompa-
nying text. In order to present a complete picture of the value of DNA
identification evidence, this Note also considers the privacy concerns generated
by DNA testing and particular issues raised by the creation of databases of DNA
identification information. See infra notes 143-64 and accompanying text.
19. For a complete discussion of theJones court's reasoning, see infra notes
165-92. For a discussion of the potentially detrimental effect of Jones on the
Fourth Amendment rights of non-violent felons, see infra notes 230-34.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.").
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that physical or elec-
tronic intrusion into area where one has reasonable expectation of privacy is
"search" in constitutional terms and is presumptively unreasonable unless con-
ducted pursuant to search warrant).
23. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)(reasonableness "of a particular practice 'is judged by balancing its intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests'" (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979))).
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in Schmerber v. California.24
In Schmerber, the Supreme Court noted that a blood test implicates
"interests in human dignity and privacy" protected by the Fourth
Amendment.25 The Court applied the Katz definition of a "search" and
held that a non-consensual blood test was a Fourth Amendment
search.26 In 1989, the Court reiterated this principle in Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives' Ass'n 27 stating that "it is obvious that this physical
intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of pri-
vacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."'28
Regarding the degree of government suspicion required for a blood
test to be a reasonable search, the Schmerber Court noted that "the
Fourth Amendment . . . forbid[s] any such intrusion[] on the mere
chance that desired evidence might be obtained." 29 Although the
Schmerber Court considered a blood test to be a relatively minor intrusion
on the suspect's privacy,8 0 the Court suggested that ordinarily the
Fourth Amendment would require a search warrant for any non-consen-
sual blood test.31 Nevertheless, the Schmerber Court held that the blood
test at issue fulfilled constitutional requirements despite having been
performed without either a warrant or probable cause because emer-
gency circumstances existed.8 2
24. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). In Schmerber, the
Court held that a warrantless blood-alcohol test of a person arrested on prob-
able cause did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 772. The Court noted
that under the circumstances the officer could reasonably believe that the alco-
hol would dissipate from the suspect's blood stream before a warrant could be
obtained. Ia at 770.
25. Id. at 769-70.
26. Id. at 770.
27. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
28. Id. at 616 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966)).
29. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
30. Id. at 771. "Such tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic
physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of
blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." Id. (footnote omitted). The Schmerber Court
also cautioned that its holding that the Fourth Amendment permitted blood
tests "under stringently limited conditions" did not mean either that greater
intrusions would be permitted or that blood tests would be permitted in other
circumstances. Id. at 772. The Court identified one such "other circumstance"
in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985), which held that surgery under
general anesthetic to retrieve a bullet lodged in a suspect's chest was an unrea-
sonable search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
31. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 ("Search warrants are ordinarily required for
searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be required
where intrusions into the human body are concerned.").
32. Id. at 770 ("The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably
have believed that he was confronted with an emergency" because alcohol
would disappear from suspect's blood before warrant could be obtained.). The
Court also noted that a blood test was a relatively minor intrusion on the sus-
pect's privacy and that the test was performed in a "hospital environment ac-
cording to accepted medical practices." Id at 771.
1622 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
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In addition to the Schmerber analysis of non-consensual blood test-
ing, two lines of Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourth Amend-
ment are also relevant in determining the reasonableness of non-
consensual DNA testing of prisoners: prisoners' rights cases33 and sus-
picionless search cases. 34 Cases dealing with the Fourth Amendment
rights of prisoners are apposite because the subjects of the DNA testing
inJones were convicted felons 35 and because the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the constitutional rights of prisoners are necessarily altered
by the fact of their incarceration.3 6 Similarly, cases dealing with the de-
gree of individualized suspicion, if any, required to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard are of interest because the DNA
testing at issue inJones was conducted in the absence of any individual-
ized suspicion whatsoever.3 7
2. Prisoners' Rights Cases
Although prisoners retain some constitutional rights while incarcer-
ated, the extent of their retained protection under the Fourth Amend-
33. For a discussion of cases concerning the Fourth Amendment rights of
prisoners, see infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of cases concerning circumstances under which the
Fourth Amendment permits searches conducted without individualized suspi-
cion, see infra notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
35. Jones, 962 F.2d at 304 (noting that Virginia law being challenged sub-jected all convicted felons to non-consensual DNA testing).
36. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) ("[Convicted prisoners do
not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and con-
finement in prison."); see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (reaffirm-
ing that "the convicted felon does not forfeit all constitutional protections by
reason of his conviction"); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974)
("There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of
this country.").
However, the Court has just as consistently recognized that incarceration
does curtail prisoners' Fourth Amendment rights. Bell, 441 U.S. at 545-46
("The fact of confinement as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the pe-
nal institution limits (their] retained constitutional rights."); see Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984) (noting that "we have insisted that prison-
ers be accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment
itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration" and briefly discussing
series of cases defining prisoners' retained rights under various aspects of First,
Fifth and Eighth Amendments).
37. Jones, 962 F.2d at 313 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) ("As both parties
concede, the DNA testing involved in the present case [was] not based upon any
individualized suspicion of the persons tested .... ). For a discussion of the
suspicionless search cases, see infra notes 54-75.
1993] NOTE 1623
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ment is exceedingly small.38 For example, in Bell v. Wolfish,39 the Court
held that routine visual body cavity searches of pretrial detainees were
not unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.40 The Bell
Court articulated four principles derived from previous cases that
guided its analysis. 4" First, the Court acknowledged that prisoners do
not lose all constitutional protections simply because they are incarcer-
ated.4 2 Second, the Court reiterated that incarceration nonetheless lim-
its those retained protections. 4s Third, the Court emphasized that
institutional security, a prison's central goal, could also limit prisoners'
retained constitutional rights.4 4 Fourth, the Court observed that prison
officials require "wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution
of policies and practices" to maintain institutional security.45
Using these four principles, the Bell Court determined the constitu-
tionality of visual body cavity searches of pretrial detainees by applying a
balancing test.4 6 The Court balanced the government's interests in
maintaining institutional security and controlling contraband in the
38. See generally Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526 (holding suspicionless searches of
prisoners' cells reasonable under Fourth Amendment); Bell, 441 U.S. at 558
(upholding body cavity searches of pretrial detainees); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d
1188, 1194-97 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding non-consensual blood tests of pris-
oners to detect HIV infection under Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1059 (1990).
39. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
40. Ide at 558. Bell was a class action suit brought by pretrial detainees to
challenge the practices and conditions at a federal short-term facility located in
New York City. Id at 523. One challenged procedure required that a visual
body cavity search be conducted as part of a strip search after every contact visit
between any prisoner and a person from outside the institution. Id. at 558. The
purpose for the searches was to discover and deter smuggling of contraband or
weapons into the prison. Id Although the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that this procedure violated the Fourth Amendment
prohibition of unreasonable searches, the Supreme Court disagreed. Id.
41. Id. at 545-48.
42. Id. at 545. The Court cited several examples of prisoners' retained con-
stitutional rights including freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom
from invidious racial discrimination. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974) (limitations on freedom of speech and press); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972) (freedom of religion); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (segrega-
tion); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (freedom of religion)).
43. Id. at 545-46 ("The fact of confinement as well as the legitimate goals
and policies of the penal institution limits (sic] these retained constitutional
rights." (citations omitted)).
44. Id. at 546-47 ("[E]ven when an institutional restriction infringes a spe-
cific constitutional guarantee .... the practice must be evaluated in the light of
the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional secur-
ity." (citations omitted)).
45. Id. at 547. The Court cited two reasons for this judicial deference: 1)
prison officials' expertise and experience normally make them better able to
judge the necessity and appropriateness of a given procedure and 2) the Consti-
tution places the operation of prisons in the legislative and executive branches
of the government, not the judiciary. Id. at 547-48.
46. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-60.
1624 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss5/6
prison against the prisoners' privacy interests and concluded that the
government's interests prevailed. 47 The Bell Court stated that courts
"must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in
which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in
which it is conducted" as important factors when performing such
Fourth Amendment analysis.48
Five years later, the Supreme Court went beyond Bell in Hudson v.
Palmer49 and held that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his or her cell, so that the intrusion in that case did not even
amount to a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. 50 To justify its
position, the Hudson Court stated that "[t]he recognition of privacy
rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled
with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal
institutions." 5' Like the Bell Court, the Hudson Court employed a bal-
ancing test in its Fourth Amendment analysis and weighed the prison-
ers' interests in the privacy of their cells against society's interest in
prison security. 52 The Hudson court concluded that the prisoners' as-
serted expectation of privacy was unreasonable.5 3
Prisoners' rights cases suggest considerations for the Fourth
Amendment analysis of non-consensual blood tests performed on pris-
oners in order to create databases of DNA test results. These considera-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 559 (citing several Fourth Amendment cases including United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) and Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966)). The Court expressly did not concern itself with the effective-
ness of the visual body cavity searches in promoting their intended ends. Id.
The Court pointed to evidence in the record and in other cases that these
searches had been productive elsewhere and did not treat as significant the fact
that only one such search at the prison in question had revealed contraband. Id.
49. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Hudson was an action by Rus-
sell Thomas Palmer, Jr., a pro se prisoner-plaintiff, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. l
at 519-20. Palmer argued that a random, "shakedown" search of his prison cell
had violated his constitutional rights. Id.
50. Id. at 525-26 (holding that "shakedown search" of prison cell did not
amount to Fourth Amendment "search"). The Court reasoned that because so-
ciety does not recognize as reasonable any subjective expectation of privacy a
prisoner may have in his or her cell, "the Fourth Amendment proscription
against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison
cell." Id. at 526.
51. Id. The Court noted that prison administrators must protect the safety
of prison personnel, visitors and the prisoners themselves by controlling weap-
ons and other contraband and that they must also preserve a sanitary prison
environment. Id. The Court asserted that it would be impossible to accomplish
these objectives if prisoners retained a right of privacy in their cells. Id. at 527.
52. Id. at 527 ("Determining whether an expectation of privacy is 'legiti-
mate' or 'reasonable' necessarily entails a balancing of interests.").
53. Id. at 527-28. The Hudson Court struck the required balance "in favor
of institutional security," noting its central importance in the prison setting. Id.
at 527. In its balancing, the Court also noted that the prisoner's privacy interest
was "already limited by the exigencies of the circumstances" and that society's
interest in prisoner security was "paramount." Id. at 527-28.
1993] NOTE 1625
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tions include whether a prisoner has any reasonable expectation of
privacy at all in the area being searched and whether the search serves
important government penal interests. Similarly, Supreme Court cases
concerning whether the Fourth Amendment permits searches con-
ducted without individualized suspicion also suggest factors that may af-
fect the Fourth Amendment analysis of the constitutionality of such non-
consensual blood tests.
3. Cases Addressing Searches Conducted Without Individualized Suspicion
State officials perform DNA identification analysis on prisoners'
blood not because they suspect any prisoner of having committed un-
solved past crimes, but rather because of the possibility that any pris-
oner may commit future crimes. 54 The search represented by this blood
testing is therefore conducted without any suspicion directed at the sub-
ject as an individual. 55 Although the Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed the constitutionality of suspicionless DNA testing, it has
considered the Fourth Amendment implications of similar suspicionless
searches in other contexts.
The most important suspicionless search case to date is Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n.5 6 In Skinner, the Court refused to make
individualized suspicion a per se requirement for reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment.5 7 Instead, to determine the degree of individu-
alized suspicion required in order to justify mandatory railroad em-
ployee drug-testing under the Fourth Amendment, the Court applied
the "special needs" test.58 Under the "special needs" test, if the gov-
54. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir.) ("ITlhe collection of
blood samples [to create a DNA database] is designed to solve future cases for
which no present suspicion can exist."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992).
55. Id.
56. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). In
Skinner, the Supreme Court upheld Federal Railroad Administration regulations
which mandated drug testing, including both blood and urine tests, of railroad
employees involved in particular types of train accidents as not violative of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 606, 634.
57. The Skinner Court stated: "In limited circumstances, where the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important govern-
mental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a re-
quirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the
absence of such suspicion." 489 U.S. at 624. The Court reiterated this position
in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab:
While we have often emphasized... that a search must be supported,
as a general matter, by a warrant issued upon probable cause ... our
decision in (Skinner] reaffirms the longstanding principle that neither a
warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized
suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every
circumstance.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (de-
cided same day as Skinner) (citations omitted).
58. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873(1987)). In Giffin the Court defined the "special needs" test as follows: when
1626 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss5/6
1993] NoTE 1627
ernment can show a need beyond the ordinary needs of law enforce-
ment, the court will balance the individual's privacy expectations against
the competing government interests to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment requires a warrant or probable cause to justify the search at
issue.59
The Skinner Court held that the Fourth Amendment required
neither a warrant6" nor any degree of individualized suspicion to justify
the drug-testing searches at issue. 6 1 This conclusion rested in part on
the Court's finding that railroad employees have a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy by virtue of their participation in an industry pervasively
regulated to ensure safety.6 2 The Court also applied the "special
the government shows "special needs, beyond the normal needs for law enforce-
ment," a court must balance the governmental and privacy interests to detei-
mine whether a requirement of a warrant and/or probable cause is practicable in
the particular context. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
The Skinner Court noted that in prior cases it had identified several such "special
needs." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74 (operation
of state probation system); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 (1987)
(regulation of certain businesses where regulatory scheme serves substantial
government interest); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-25 (1987) (opera-
tion of public hospital); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-42 (operation of school); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (operation of prison)). The Skinner Court
held that the need to ensure safety by regulating the conduct of railroad employ-
ees constituted a "special need" that justified examining the utility of the war-
rant requirement in this context. Id. at 620.
59. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 ("When faced with such special needs, we have
not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the
practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular
context." (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873)). The Skinner Court concluded that the
government's compelling interest in safety outweighed the employees' privacy
interests, and the regulations therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 633; see National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665-66 (1989) (using "special needs" test to find that drug testing of certain
Customs Department employees did not violate Fourth Amendment).
60. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-24. The Court reasoned that a warrant ordina-
rily assures the citizen that the intrusion was objectively determined to be au-
thorized by law and limited in scope. Id. at 622. Because the regulations in
question were narrowly drawn to minimize discretion in enforcement, they ade-
quately served this interest. Id. The Court also noted that requiring a warrant
would effectively frustrate the government interest involved by allowing the
drugs to dissipate from the employees' blood streams before they could be
tested. Id. at 623; accord Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)
(finding exigent circumstances based in part on dissipation of alcohol from sus-
pect's bloodstream). After balancing the governmental and individual privacy
interests, the Skinner Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not re-
quire a warrant to justify these drug tests. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
61. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633. The Court reasoned that the government in-
terest in determining employee responsibility for accidents and the difficulty of
identifying signs of impairment in the aftermath of an accident outweighed the
employees' reduced expectations of privacy in a pervasively regulated industry.
I. Consequently, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require
probable cause to justify these drug tests. Id-
62. Id. at 627-28 ("ITihe covered employees ha[d] long been a principal
11
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needs" test in National Treasuty Employees Union v. Von Raab,63 decided
the same day as Skinner.64 Taken together, Skinner and Von Raab estab-
lish satisfaction of the "special needs" test as one manner in which a
search conducted without individualized suspicion may nevertheless sat-
isfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has also decided several cases concerning auto-
mobile checkpoints that address the degree of individualized suspicion,
if any, required to justify such a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.65
For example, in Michigan Department of State Police v. SitZ, 6 6 the Court used
a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of an unannounced so-
briety checkpoint. 67 In holding that the checkpoint was a reasonable
seizure, 68 the Sitz Court balanced "the State's interest in preventing
drunken driving [and] the extent to which [the] system [of checkpoints
focus of regulatory concern."); see Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 ("Unlike most pri-
vate citizens or government employees in general, employees involved in drug
interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and pro-
bity."). The Skinner Court noted, however, that the privacy expectations of em-
ployees in a pervasively regulated industry will not always be considered
minimal. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
63. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
64. Id. at 665 (noting use of "special needs" test in Skinner). The Court
noted that "the traditional probable-cause standard may be unhelpful in analyz-
ing the reasonableness of routine administrative functions." Id at 668 (citing
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)).
65. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (uphold-
ing sobriety checkpoints); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543(1976) (upholding unannounced random immigration checkpoints on highways
near Mexican border).
66. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
67. Id. at 455. The State of Michigan established a pilot sobriety check-
point program and conducted the checkpoint at issue in Sitz during a single one
hour and fifteen minute operation in which 126 vehicles were briefly stopped
and their drivers questioned. l at 448. The state police delayed each vehicle
an average of 25 seconds. Id The checkpoint program was challenged the day
before it went into operation by a number of "licensed driver[s] in the State of
Michigan... who regularly travel[] throughout the State" by automobile who
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. During pretrial proceedings, the
State agreed to suspend the checkpoint operation until the litigation was finally
decided. Id
68. Id at 450 ("Petitioners concede, correctly .... that a Fourth Amend-
ment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint."). In addition
to noting the petitioners' concession that a checkpoint amounts to a seizure, the
Sitz Court cited Brower v. City of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) in support of its
position. Id. In Brower the Court defined a "seizure" in Fourth Amendment
terms as occurring "only when there is a governmental termination of freedom
of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (empha-
sis in original) cited in Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450. The Fourth Amendment protects the
people "against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Reasonableness is thus the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, and the
Court uses similar balancing tests to determine the reasonableness of both
searches and seizures. See 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1:19
(2d. ed. 1991).
1628 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
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could] reasonably be said to advance that interest, [against] the degree
of intrusion upon individual motorists." 69  The Court held that the
highway sobriety checkpoint program at issue was a reasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. 70
The Court had used a similar balancing test earlier in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte7 l in which it held that permanent immigration check-
points set up to detect the transportation of illegal aliens did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. 72 In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court analogized to
prior traffic-checking cases in order to establish that a balancing test was
appropriate to evaluate the reasonableness of such stops as seizures
under the Fourth Amendment. 73 The Court then balanced the public
69. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. The Court derived the balancing test used in Sitz
from balancing tests used in two prior cases. Id. at 448-50 (citing Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543(1976)). The Court rejected the lower court's interpretation of "the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest" prong as requiring an examina-
tion of the checkpoints' "effectiveness" in deterring drunk driving. Id. at 453-
55.
The Court identified the individual privacy interest being weighed as in-
cluding the motorists' "fear and surprise" at being stopped. Id. at 452. The
Court found that the Michigan courts had consequently over-valued the motor-
ists' privacy interests by giving too much weight to this fear and surprise. Id.
The Court held that the proper balancing factor consisted of only the "fear and
surprise engendered in law abiding motorists by the nature of the stop." Id
Recharacterized in this way, the Court concluded that the extremely brief stop,
even while accounting for the motorists' fear and surprise, was a minor intru-
sion. Id at 452-53.
Against this minor intrusion, the Court balanced the governmental interest
in establishing the checkpoint program. Id. at 453. The Court emphasized that
the question of whether a particular law enforcement strategy reasonably ad-
vances the government interest does not include an inquiry into the strategy's
effectiveness. Id. at 453-54. The Court emphasized that this factor "was not
meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision
as to which among reasonable law enforcement techniques should be employed
to deal with a serious public danger .... [T]he choice among ... reasonable
alternative [law enforcement techniques] remains with the government offi-
cials." Id.
70. Id at 455.
71. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
72. See id. at 566. Martinez-Fuerte concerned stops of illegal aliens made at
permanent immigration checkpoints located on highways near the Mexican bor-
der based upon no "articulable suspicion." Id. at 547. The Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
that "a stop for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol reasonably
suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the basis of articulable facts." Id at
549.
73. Id. at 555-56; see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975)
(holding that Fourth Amendment requires probable cause or consent to author-
ize vehicle searches at permanent border checkpoint); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973) (holding that roving border patrol
stops conducted without any individualized suspicion violated Fourth Amend-
ment and implicitly requiring probable cause for such stops); cf. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-81 (1975) (holding that roving patrol stops
of motorists in border area could be justified by reasonable suspicion).
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and private interests at issue, including the potential for creating fear
and concern in the motorists being stopped, to determine Fourth
Amendment reasonableness. 74 Thus, in the seizure cases, as well as the
search cases, the Supreme Court has concluded that "the Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized]
suspicion.75
The suspicionless search and seizure cases illuminate three consid-
erations that might make non-consensual DNA testing an exception to
the general rule of Schmerber, requiring a warrant for a blood test. 76
These considerations include: (1) whether DNA testing represents a mi-
nor intrusion comparable to a sobriety checkpoint; (2) whether a state's
interest in establishing a DNA identification database is beyond the ordi-
nary needs of law enforcement or is comparable to the governmental
interest in preventing drunk driving or illegal immigration; and (3)
whether prisoners have a reduced expectation of privacy comparable to
employees in a comprehensively regulated industry.
In Dunn v. White,77 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit looked to both the prisoners' rights cases 78 and to the suspi-
cionless search cases 79 in upholding mandatory, non-consensual AIDS
testing of prisoners. 80 Initially, the court reviewed Supreme Court pre-
cedent regarding prisoners' rights, including Bell and Hudson, and prison
drug testing cases in other circuits. 81 The court then applied the "spe-
cial needs" test from Skinner,82 noting that the Skinner Court had identi-
74. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-62 (balancing recognized substantial
public interest in controlling illegal immigration against permanent checkpoints'
minimal interference with legitimate traffic and limited potential for generating
fear and concern in motorists being stopped).
. 75. Id at 561 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)(upholding building inspections of private homes pursuant to "area" warrant
not based on suspicion of defects in particular building)); see Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) ("We made it clear, however,[in prior decisions] that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitu-
tional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable.").
76. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966). For a full discus-
sion of the holding and reasoning of the Court in Schmerber, see supra notes 24-32
and accompanying text.
77. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1059 (1990).
78. For a discussion of the prisoners' rights cases, see supra notes 38-53 and
accompanying text.
79. For a discussion of the suspicionless search cases, see supra notes 54-75
and accompanying text.
80. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197. In Dunn, a pro se prisoner-plaintiff challenged
mandatory, non-consensual AIDS testing. Id at 1190. He argued that the
"AIDS testing served no legitimate purpose, because after identifying [the] car-
riers, the prison neither treated nor quarantined those prisoners." Id.
81. Id at 1191-92. For a discussion of Bell and Hudson, see supra notes 38-
53 and accompanying text.
82. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1194. For a discussion of Skinner, see supra notes 56-
62 and accompanying text.
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fled operating a prison as a "special need" of law enforcement. 88 The
Dunn court then balanced "the intrusiveness of the blood test against
the prison's need to administer the test."'8 4 Thus, Dunn provides one
model for Fourth Amendment analysis of blood testing in the prison
setting.85 Determining whether this model is appropriate for evaluating
the constitutionality of non-consensual blood tests to provide ,samples
for DNA testing, however, first requires an understanding of forensic
DNA testing itself.
B. Forensic DNA Testing
The reliability and admissibility of the evidence produced by a DNA
database necessarily affect the governmental interest in testing prisoners
to create that database. If DNA identification evidence were perfectly
reliable and universally admissible, then the governmental interest in
creating a DNA database from which to obtain this evidence would be
very strong. Similarly, the information about the prisoner that DNA test
results confer affects the prisoner's privacy interest. A committee of the
National Research Council has considered these concerns and has made
recommendations regarding the advisability of creating databases of
DNA test results for use in later criminal investigations.86 This section
will address the reliability,8 7 admissibility8 8 and privacy89 issues before
going on to consider the committee report.
1. DNA Analysis Techniques90
Scientists and courts almost universally accept the general scientific
principles that underlie DNA testing (the "DNA paradigm"). 91 For ex-
83. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1194 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 498 U.S. 602, 620 (1989)).
84. Id. at 1194.
85. Id. at 1194-97 (holding non-consensual HIV testing of prisoner consti-
tutional using "special needs" test).
86. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 111-30. For a discussion of the
committee's conclusions and recommendations, see infra notes 151-60 and ac-
companying text.
87. For a discussion of the procedural and statistical sources of error that
impact on the reliability of DNA identification evidence, see infra notes 107-20
and accompanying text.
88. For a discussion of the admissibility of DNA identification evidence, see
infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text.
89. For a discussion of the information conferred by DNA test results, see
infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
90. For a brief, non-technical description of DNA identification analysis, see
K.F. Kelly et al., Method and Applications of DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide for the Non-
Scientist, 1987 CRIM. L. REv. 105.
91. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 60, 61 & n.75 (1989) (recom-
mending both technical, scientific sources and more approachable references on
DNA paradigm); see State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 511 (Wash. 1993) ("[N]o
court has rejected RFLP testing on the basis that it was not generally accepted by
the scientific community."); GENEC WrrNEss, supra note 2, at 3-6, 41-50
16311993] NOTE
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ample, there is near-universal agreement that the DNA molecule takes
the form of a double helix, or twisted ladder, whose rungs are pairs of
molecules called bases that combine only in a known way. 92 The se-
quence of these base-pairs contains the inherited genetic information
that makes the individual unique.93 For DNA identification, the princi-
ple that DNA is unique to the individual (except an identical twin) and
unchanging over his or her life is the most significant aspect of the DNA
paradigm. 9 4 Even though each person's DNA is unique, "the similari-
ties among individuals of the same species far outnumber the differ-
ences." 95 Only certain sections of the DNA molecule vary among
individuals; these sections are known as "polymorphic." 96 Testing DNA
in order to identify the donor, known as DNA "typing" or "fingerprint-
(describing DNA paradigm); Michael J. DiRusso, DNA "Profiles" - The Problems
of Technology Transfer, 8 J. HUM. RTs. 183, 185 n.15 (1990) (citing Caldwell v.
Georgia, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990) (defendant challenged quality control in DNA
testing not underlying science)).
Professors Thompson and Ford identify four key tenets of the DNA para-
digm. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 60-63. First, DNA is unique to the
individual (except an identical twin), but unchanging over the individual's life.
Id. at 61-62. Second, the structure of the DNA molecule is a double helix, or
"twisted ladder," with rails of phosphate and sugar and rungs of pairs of four
molecules or "bases" (A, T, C, and.G). Id. at 62. These bases combine accord-
ing to the base-pair rule: A with T and C with G. Id. Third, the order of the
base-pairs along the DNA molecule is called the "DNA sequence" or "genetic
code." Id. Only certain sections of this code vary among individuals; they are
known as "polymorphic." Id. Different versions of the same gene (sequence of
base pairs) are known as "alleles." Id. Fourth, the DNA molecule can be disas-
sembled by either breaking it into shorter fragments or "unzipping" it into two
single strands of DNA. Id. at 62-63. The combination of two complementary
single strands of DNA according to the base-pair rule is called "hybridization."
Id. at 63. Genetic engineers have created molecules called "genetic probes" that
seek out and lock on to complementary sequences during hybridization. Id.
92. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 62. The significance of this feature
of DNA is that a single strand of DNA will combine, or "hybridize," only with a
complementary strand. Id. at 63. Thus, "genetic probes," which are single
strands of DNA of a known composition, will only combine with complementary
strands, conclusively demonstrating the presence of the reciprocal series of ba-
ses in the DNA being tested. Id.
93. Id. at 61 ("DNA is unique but unchanging."); see Kelly et al., supra note
90, at 105-06 (referring to chromosomes, which are made up of DNA, as
"human blueprint").
94. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 61-62; see DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 2 at 9 ("[N]o two persons (barring identical twins) have the same DNA
sequence.").
95. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 63.
96. Id. at 62; see State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 513 (Wash. 1993) (noting
that "only a small percentage of the overall number of positions on the human
genome [total DNA sequence] are variable (0.1 to 0.3 percent of 3 billion [posi-
tions]") (citation omitted)). Different versions of the same gene (sequence of
base pairs) are known as alleles. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 62. Testing
a sample for the presence or absence of certain alleles is an alternative to RFLP
as a method of DNA analysis. Id. at 64, 76-81 (discussing allele specific probe
analysis as provided by Cetus Corporation).
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ing," requires testing those locations on the DNA molecule where "dif-
ferences among individuals are most pronounced," that is, those which
are most polymorphic.97
The technique most commonly used for DNA identification is re-
striction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis.98 RFLP analy-
sis is used by the FBI and is one of three commercially available methods
of DNA identification. 9 9 RFLP analysis consists of a series of seven sep-
arate procedures.10 0 DNA testing technology does not presently allow
97. See Cauthron, 846 P.2d at 513; Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 63
("The particular breakthrough that allowed DNA to be 'typed' was the develop-
ment of genetic probes capable of identifying polymorphic DNA segments,
those small areas within the DNA chain where the differences among individuals
are most pronounced." (footnote omitted)). The Cauthron court stated:
If the autorad (produced by RFLP analysis] reflects only monomorphic
sites, it imparts no information whatsoever about the defendant. In
other words, if the probes used only detect sites on the DNA which are
common to all human beings, the evidence obtained cannot be the ba-
sis for identifying the defendant.
Cauthron, 846 P.2d at 513.
98. GENETIC WITNESS, supra note 2, at 4 ("Although the specific protocols
used for RFLP analysis vary from laboratory to laboratory, the vast majority of
forensic casework carried out today involves this basic approach."); see Thomp-
son & Ford, supra note 2, at 48 (noting that RFLP analysis is probably best
known).
99. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 48-49. These three tests are: "DNA
fingerprinting," offered by Cellmark Diagnostics Corporation, "DNAPrint," of-
fered by Lifecodes Corporation, and the test offered by the Cetus Corporation.
Id. Both "DNAPrint and "DNA fingerprinting" use RFLP analysis. Id. For a
discussion of the relative merits of the three tests, see Thompson & Ford, supra
note 2, at 48-52; and DiRusso, supra note 91, at 189-191 (comparing RFLP anal-
ysis and Cetus test). For a list of major articles regarding each test, see Thomp-
son & Ford, supra note 2, at 59 n.70. For a lengthy discussion of the Cellmark
test and its treatment by the courts, see Colorado v. Lindsey, No. 90-CA0556,
1993 WL 2650, at *5-7 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1993) (affirming trial court's ad-
mission of DNA testing evidence performed by Cellmark).
This Note, however, addresses only the method of DNA testing at issue in
Jones v. Murray: the "DNAPrint" test, which uses the RFLP analysis testing
method. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 304 (4th Cir.) (identifying and
describing the "DNAPrint" test), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992); Thompson
& Ford, supra note 2, at 48 (identifying "DNAPrint test" as product of RFLP
analysis). The "DNAPrint" test used in Virginia is the result of RFLP analysis
and is ordinarily a product of Lifecodes Corporation. Thompson & Ford, supra
note 2, at 48-49. However, Virginia was the first state to conduct its own DNA
testing. GENETC WrrNrss, supra note 2, at 151 Box 6-D. Virginia entered into a
technology transfer program with Lifecodes Corporation whereby "selected Vir-
ginia laboratory personnel received (four] weeks of training at the Lifecodes fa-
cility in New York to learn DNA typing procedures and quality control measures,
and take a proficiency test." Id. Although Virginia uses the FBI protocol, it is
still based on RFLP analysis. Id. at 116, 151 Box 6-D.
100. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 64-76; see GENETIC WrrNEss, supra
note 2, at 44-46 (six steps, not including interpretation); DiRusso, supra note
91, at 197-99 (relying partly on Thompson and Ford). For a more scientifically
sophisticated discussion of RFLP analysis, see DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2,
at 36-40.
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direct examination of the total unique sequence of base-pairs along the
DNA molecule.1 0 ' Instead, RFLP analysis examines the length of the
fragments on which certain polymorphic base-pair sequences appear
when the DNA molecule is cut in predetermined places.' 0 2 RFLP analy-
sis thereby produces an autoradiograph with dark bands; these bands
indicate the presence of fragments containing the sought-after se-
quences and the approximate length of those fragments.' 0 3
The basic premise of DNA identification through RFLP analysis has
been described thus:
In samples from a given individual, the fragments identified by
First, the DNA is extracted from the biological material (i.e. blood) that may
have dried onto a surface such as clothing. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at
65-67. Next, the DNA molecule is "cut" at specific sites in a process called re-
striction digestion. Id at 67-69. The third step is gel electrophoresis, where
electrical current is used to sort the negatively charged fragments by length. Id.
at 69-70. Fourth, a .permanent 'copy'" of the array of DNA fragments is trans-
ferred onto a sheet of nylon membrane, by a process called Southern transfer,
and the fragments are separated into single strands. Id. at 70-71. The fifth step
is hybridization, where the radioactively tagged probe molecule locks onto a spe-
cific polymorphic DNA segment on the blot. Id. at 71-74. Sixth, the blot is
placed on a piece of X-ray film; the radioactive probe exposes the film at the
location of the polymorphic DNA segment. Id. at 74. Finally, technicians inter-
pret the resulting autoradiographs to determine whether the bands produced by
the unknown sample match those produced by the known sample. Id. at 74-76.
101. GENETIC WrrNEss, supra note 2, at 42 (stating that DNA testing pro-
vides "snapshot of a specific area" on DNA molecule); see DNA TECHNOLOCY,
supra note 2, at 28 ("Thus, the traditional forensic paradigm of genetic testing as
a tool for exclusion was in a linguistic stroke [fueled by mass media accounts of
DNA testing] changed to a paradigm of identification."). DNA profiling actually
tests "identifiable length polymorphisms," places where given fragments of
DNA vary in length from individual to individual. DiRusso, supra note 91, at 189("[These identifiable length polymorphisms.., are the subject of the rest of the
DNA testing and analysis.").
102. DiRusso, supra note 91, at 188-89 ("These tests essentially measure
the resulting polymorphic fragments to see if they match."). These fragments
are produced by "restriction enzymes": naturally occurring compounds that rec-
ognize certain palindromic base-pair sequences and break the DNA molecule
only in those places. Kelly et al., supra note 90, at 107. Different individuals'
DNA will contain these palindromic base-pair sequences at different locations on
the DNA molecule, thus creating fragments of different lengths; this variation in
the length of the fragments produced is "length polymorphism." DiRusso, supra
note 91, at 188-89. Because a given length fragment may be found in a signifi-
cant proportion of the population, DNA tests examine several different frag-
ments. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 48 ("likelihood of a coincidental
match on all of the bands [produced by different fragments] is low"); see Richard
Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With
Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 303, 314 (1991) (noting that at
present three to four sites are tested and suggesting that greater reliability
would be achieved if more sites were tested).
103. Kelly et al., supra note 90, at 108 (comparing pattern of bands pro-
duced on autoradiograph to "bar code on the side of a food package"); see Lon-
gobardi, supra note 3, at 329 (reproducing with permission photograph of
example of DNA identification autoradiograph produced by RFLP).
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the probe will be the same length, while in samples from differ-
ent individuals the length of these fragments is likely to differ.
Hence, if the probe identifies fragments of the same length in
two samples, it is evidence that the samples have a common
source.
10 4
This information is merely evidence of a common DNA source because
although generally no two people have identical DNA, two people can
nonetheless have identical DNA test results, or DNA profiles.' 05 The
results are the same because DNA testing compares only a very small
minority of the millions of places in which two people's DNA may dif-
fer. 10 6 Once a suspect's DNA and crime scene evidence containing
DNA have been tested, and the results have been compared, the reliabil-
ity and admissibility of this information as evidence remains to be
determined.
2. Reliability of DNA Identification Evidence
Commentators have recently raised caveats concerning the reliabil-
ity of DNA identification evidence.' 0 7 Their concerns focus on two is-
104. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 64. "Because the polymorphic[DNA] segments differ markedly from one individual to the next, the length of
the restriction fragments containing these key DNA segments is likely to differ
among individuals as well." l at 67-68. Another commentator has summa-
rized the process somewhat differently:
Stated simply, DNA identification testing takes advantage of these vari-
ations in RFLP length by extracting DNA from a tissue sample, cutting
the DNA into its characteristic lengths, separating those lengths on the
basis of size and visualizing the separated fragments on photographic
film by means of radioactive probes. If performed properly, this pro-
cess yields an RFLP banding pattern, or autoradiograph, that is highly
characteristic of the individual and which may be useful for matching
forensic samples to a suspect ....
Dan L. Burk, DNA Identification Testing: Assessing the Threat to Privacy, 24 U. TOL. L.
REV. 87, 90 (1992).
105. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 80 ("[TMwo unrelated individuals
may be identical with regard to the polymorphism examined by a particular test,
and therefore can have the same DNA type."); id. at 80 n.163 (noting greater
probability of coincidental match between two related individuals); DNA TECH-
NOLOGY, supra note 2, at 9 (noting chance of same results from different individu-
als due to small number of sites tested and "limited resolution'for measuring the
variability at each site"); see DiRusso, supra note 91, at 187 (calling this fact
"crux" of controversy regarding transfer of DNA analysis technology from labo-
ratory to courtroom); cf. State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512 (Wash. 1993)("There is no doubt that if the technology existed to analyze the entire length of
DNA and compare it to another complete DNA molecule, an absolute identifica-
tion could be provided.").
106. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 74. The authors of DNA Technology
suggest that despite the chance that two people's DNA test results might be
identical, a "match" between two test results should nonetheless "be considered
strong evidence that the two samples came from the same source." IM
107. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 102, at 334-35 (noting that DNA testing
technology is "in its infancy"); DNA TECHNOLOGY supra note 2, at 1 ("important
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sues: the proficiency of DNA testing laboratories and the statistical
assumptions underlying the manner in which experts present DNA iden-
tification evidence to ajury.108 Procedural problems affect the reliability
of DNA identification evidence because DNA analysis is an exacting sci-
entific process "where nuances of laboratory procedure can have a dra-
matic effect on the reliability of the test."10 9 In addition, because DNA
testing procedures were originally developed for use on pristine labora-
tory samples, the age and condition of samples obtained from crime
questions have been raised about reliability, validity, and confidentiality" of
DNA typing); see also Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 48 (intent of article was
to "identify and illuminate the key issues that are likely to arise with regard to
the reliability of DNA typing evidence").
108. For a discussion of the procedural sources of error in forensic DNA
testing, see infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
statistical sources of error, see infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
109. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 58; see State v. Bruno, 424 S.E.2d
440, 445 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("(A] trial court may decide as a matter of law that
DNA evidence is inadmissible for any number of reasons including, but not lim-
ited to, unreliable procedures or results, contamination of the sample or chain
of custody questions."); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 996, 999 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1989) (excluding DNA identification evidence as being result of faulty
laboratory procedures); see also Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 52, 64 (not-
ing that DNA analysis requires "complicated series of procedures, drawn from
molecular biology, which may vary in their reliability and degree of acceptance
in the scientific community" and that "[u]nreliability in any one of these proce-
dures can compromise the over-all validity of the test"); Boyce Rensberger, New
Way is Developed to Improve DNA Tests, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 18, 1992, at
A3 ("[B]ecause the test's reliability depends on how carefully a laboratory per-
forms the procedure, false results can be more common."). For a discussion of
the error potential of each step of RFLP analysis, with special attention to poten-
tial errors in the forensic setting, see Thompson and Ford, supra note 2, at 64-
76.
An example of a court addressing the complexity of the RFLP analysis pro-
cedures and the effect that laboratory conditions and scientific assumptions can
have on test results is People v. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1992). The
Keene court was asked to determine the admissibility of DNA identification evi-
dence that was challenged on the basis of an occurrence of "band-shift" on the
autoradiographs and the procedures the commercial testing laboratory had used
to correct for the problem. Id. at 736. "Band-shift" is the phenomenon of the
bands on the autoradiograph in the suspect and evidence "lanes" lining up simi-
larly in a given area of the gel, but consistently not in the same place. Id. at 737;
see Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 70 (discussing possibility of "band-shift").
This phenomenon may be caused by differences in the amount of sample on the
gel, the salinity of the gel or other environmental factors. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
738; DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 60. The Keene court held that the com-
mercial laboratory's method of correcting for "band-shift," the use of mono-
morphic probes, which ought to appear in the same place in both samples, did
not meet the Frye "general acceptance" test; consequently, the court ruled the
DNA identification evidence inadmissible. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 740-41. In
reaching its conclusion, the Keene court relied in part on the analysis of the
"band-shift" problem and the use of monomorphic probes to correct for it
found in DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 60-61, quoted in Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d
at 740.
1636
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scenes can also create procedural error. 110 This consideration is partic-
ularly important because samples found at crime scenes are frequently
degraded."' Commentators have suggested various methods to correct
these sources of procedural error, such as periodic testing of laborato-
ries and the development of strict quality control standards. 1 2
In addition to error resulting from problems in testing procedures,
the statistical problems inherent in DNA testing are a second and more
complicated source of unreliability. 113 Because DNA test results are not
unique to the individual, their value as evidence must be expressed in
110. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 65-66. First, the DNA in the sam-
ple may have begun to age and break down into shorter fragments. Id. at 65 &
n.89. If the analyst fails to recognize that the sample is degraded or that there is
insufficient material for reliable analysis, error will result. Id. at 65-66. Second,
the sample may be contaminated with "other chemical or biological agent(s]
which could interfere with the reliability of subsequent procedures." Id. at 66.
Such chemical agents are present in carpet cleaning fluids, detergents and dry-
cleaning fluids and could easily contaminate an evidence sample. Id.
111. See DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that forensic DNA
analysis often involves "samples that are degraded, contaminated, or from mul-
tiple unknown sources"); DiRusso, supra note 91, at 201 (citing Memorandum in
Opposition to the Introduction of DNA Evidence at 38; People v. Castro, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)); see also Thompson v. State, 615 So. 2d 737,
740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that forensic pathologist testified that
FBI lab considered five-year-old evidence containing semen stains too old for
DNA testing). But see People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200 (App. Div. 1992),
ajfd, No. 18, 1994 WL 99513 (N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994). In Wesley, the court noted
that:
While RFLP testing in the forensic arena presents unique problems not
encountered in other areas because the samples from which the DNA is
extracted often are contaminated or exposed to environmental influ-
ences, expert testimony [in the lower court] also established that these
factors do not degrade the quality of the DNA or compromise the
fingerprint.
Id.
112. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 66-67 (advocating independent
validation studies of testing laboratories to determine reliability of their tests
when faced with variously degraded samples). Similarly, a panel of the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences has endorsed forensic
DNA analysis in principle, but urged development of better quality control
methods. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 8, 51-73 (introduction and chapter
concerning recommendations for DNA testing procedure); see Boyce Ren-
sberger, New Way is Developed to Improve DNA Tests, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Aug.
18, 1992, at A3. One quality control method is to include in each test a set of
DNA samples from laboratory-grown human cells with a known DNA profile. Id
Any variation in the test results of the known sample will be apparent to the
technicians performing the test, revealing the effect of any procedural error. Id.
113. See Lempert, supra note 102, at 305-12 (identifying procedural and sta-
tistical problems including effect of sub- and micropopulations and limitations
of frequentist statistics); see also DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 75 (describ-
ing recent Manhattan murder case where estimates of DNA pattern frequency
ranged from 1 in 500 to 1 in 739 billion depending on underlying statistical
assumptions). For a sophisticated and comprehensible scientific discussion of
the population genetics principles underlying DNA analysis, see DNA TECHNOL-
OGY, supra note 2, at 44-50, 74-96.
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terms of the probability that someone other than the suspect left the
evidence sample at the crime scene. 1 1 4 The likelihood of a coincidental
match is calculated by finding the probability associated with each of the
polymorphisms that appear, then calculating the probability of the
whole series of polymorphisms, the DNA profile, appearing together. "15
The potential for statistical error arises because the formula used to cal-
culate the frequency of the DNA profile in the population is "only valid
when applied to populations in which the DNA fragments are statisti-
cally independent.""16 The polymorphisms are statistically independ-
114. See DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 9 ("To say that two patterns
match, without providing any scientifically valid estimate (or, at least, an upper
bound) of te frequency with which such matches might occur by chance, is
meaningless."). Forensic DNA testing involves application of population genet-
ics in order to "approximate the degree to which two samples are associated by
greater than ran dom chance." GENETIC WrrNESS, supra note 2, at 6; see DNA
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that once two DNA test patterns match,
question becomes: "What is the probability that such a match would have oc-
curred between the suspect and a person drawn at random from the same popu-
lation as the suspect?"); see also id- at 124 (noting important distinction between
finding a match between suspect and evidence samples and finding match be-
tween suspect and database samples because chances of match with database are
much greater).
Finding that two specimens produce the same DNA pattern is analogous to
finding that two specimens are the same blood type. GENETIC WrrNESS, supra
note 2, at 66. In neither case does the test result mean that the specimens were
necessarily left by the same individual. Id. Population genetics provides the
'numerical weight" to be placed on the match-the chance that it could have
arisen randomly. Id. For example, in one recent case, the prosecution at-
tempted to introduce DNA evidence to identify the suspect, claiming before the
trial judge that the probability of a coincidental match was one in 40,000,000
and arguing before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that a probability
of one in 270,000 should be presented to thejury. United States v. Porter, 618
A.2d 629, 630 & n.1 (D.C. 1992).
115. GENETIC WrrIEss, supra note 2, at 66 (noting that population fre-
quency of DNA pattern is calculated by "ascertaining the frequency of individual
bands .... [and) estimating the population frequency of the overall DNA pat-
tern"); DiRusso, supra note 91, at 210 ("Essentially, all that needs to be done is
to take the bands on the [autoradiograph], determine their uniqueness in the
population and then make a calculation of the odds that the specific combination
of unique bands would occur in the population."); DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 2, at 10 ("Each matching allele is assumed to provide statistically independ-
ent evidence, and the frequencies of the individual alleles are multiplied to-
gether to calculate a frequency of the complete DNA pattern.").
Merely calculating the frequency of a given polymorphism in the population
may create its own error potential, however, where the population studies used
in this calculation are inadequate. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 84 &
n.177 (noting error potential created by population studies published, and re-
lied upon, by Lifecodes Corporation that were conducted on "relatively small,
nonrandom samples"); see Colorado v. Lindsey, No. 90-CA0556, 1993 WL
2650, at *1 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1993) (noting that database used "ultimately
comprised DNA samples from blood taken from approximately 330 black do-
nors at a Detroit blood bank").
116. GENETIC WITNESS, supr.a note 2, at 67; see Thompson & Ford, supra
note 2, at 82 (calculation invalid if probability of finding one polymorphism is
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ent only if the probability that a particular polymorphism will be found
is unaffected by the probability that another will be found. 17 If the vari-
ations are not in fact independent, assuming that they are "could allow
misleading statistical testimony which greatly underestimates the
probability of a coincidental match," thus greatly overestimating the
likelihood that the evidence was left by the defendant." 8 Restated, if
the probability of finding one fragment is affected by the probability of
finding another, there is a danger of substantially underestimating the
likelihood of a coincidental match. 119 Recently, the Supreme Court of
Washington acknowledged these considerations in reversing a rape con-
viction based in part on DNA identification evidence. 120 The effect of
affected by presence of another); DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 10 ("scien-
tific validity" of calculation depends on whether matches of each polymorphism
"are actually statistically independent").
117. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 81 ("The bands [representing par-
ticular polymorphisms] are said to be independent if the probability of a match
on each band is unaffected by the occurrence of a match on any other band.");
GENETIC WITNESS, supra note 2, at 67 ("Essentially, the population must be one
where individuals randomly marry and reproduce, so that distinct subgroups are
absent."); see Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 445 (Mass. 1991)
(holding DNA evidence improperly admitted because based on statistical as-
sumptions that were neither generally accepted nor inherently rational); Cald-
well v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 443-44 (Ga. 1990) (reducing statistical weight of
DNA evidence to size of database rather than allowing commercial laboratory's
"enormous claimed power of identity").
118. Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 82; see Lempert, supra note 102, at
306-09 (focusing on "micropopulations"--members of the suspect's immediate
family who have statistically significant probability of very similar DNA);
DiRusso, supra note 91, at 210-14 (describing statistical problem and calling "the
present data being used ... simply and unequivocally wrong"). Compare R.C.
Lewontin & Daniel L. Hard, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 Sci-
ENCE 1745 (1991) (arguing that presently used method may create "potentially
serious errors" and proposing possible solutions) with Ranajit Chakraborty &
Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 SCIENCE 1735
(1991) (staunchly defending statistical techniques presently used in DNA testing
and strongly criticizing article by Lewontin and Hard); see also United States v.
Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 636-39 (D.C. 1992) (quoting People v. Barney, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing statistical controversy surrounding
using DNA test results as evidence in criminal trials and citing Lewontin & Hard
and Chakraborty & Kidd); Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting,
254 SCIENCE 1721 (1991) (discussing debate between Lewontin & Hartl and
Chakraborty & Kidd); Court Admits DNA Evidence, FBI's Genetic-Match Estimates:
People v. Roberto T. Rivera, County Court, Judge Tisch, N.Y. LJ., Jun. 19, 1992,
sec. Ct. Dec. at 21 (account of conflicting expert testimony on statistics underly-
ing FBI's estimates of probability of DNA test "match").
119. GENETIC WrrNEss, supra note 2, at 67 ("[T]he value calculated might
greatly underestimate the true occurrence pattern in the general population-
making a match seem rarer than it actually is.").
120. State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512-18 (Wash. 1993). In Cauthron,
the Supreme Court of Washington found "significant disagreement within the
scientific community regarding the validity of the databases used to construct
the probability estimates which ultimately determine identity." Id. at 505. The
court concluded that the trial court had admitted the evidence of a DNA
"match" in error because it was "not accompanied by statistical verification." Id
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these concerns regarding the reliability of DNA analysis for identifica-
tion on the admissibility of the results as evidence varies from court to
court. 
12 1
3. Admissibility of DNA Identification Evidence
Although courts have admitted DNA evidence for identification
purposes in criminal trials and paternity suits since 1988,122 the appro-
priate standard for its admissibility has proven to be a difficult issue for
the courts. 123 Among state courts, there are three major approaches:
the traditional, Frye "general acceptance" test, 124 the "relevancy"
test,12 5 and a three-pronged test enunciated by the court in People v. Cas-
The court reversed the defendant's conviction on seven counts of first degree
rape, but remanded "for reconsideration of the statistical evidence in light of
current scientific knowledge." Id.; see United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629(D.C. 1992) (majority and dissent differing over admissibility of DNA identifica-
tion evidence based upon scientific disagreement regarding statistics used).
121. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199, 201 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992) (suggesting that under "general acceptance" test, "ancillary issues re-
garding the integrity of the particular forensic sample.., and whether the labo-
ratory followed the accepted procedures in carrying out the tests ... speak to the
weight the evidence is accorded" and concluding that statistical assumptions
used by commercial laboratory met "general acceptance" requirement), affd,
No. 18, 1994 WL 99513 (N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994). For a discussion of the various
standards applied by courts in determining whether DNA evidence is admissible,
see infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (affirming conviction for aggravated battery, sexual battery and burglary
based in part on DNA evidence), review denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989); Peo-
ple v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 659 (Albany County Ct. 1988) (holding that
defendants could be required to submit samples for DNA analysis and that re-
sults would be admissible in subsequent trials), af'd, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (App.
Div. 1992), afjd, No. 18, 1994 WL 99513 (N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994); In re Baby Girl
S., 532 N.Y.S.2d 634, 637 (Surr. Ct. 1988) (holding DNA evidence properly ad-
mitted in paternity hearing).
123. See United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1195 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1993)(noting that "[t]here is no consensus among the state courts which have consid-
ered the admissibility of DNA evidence"). Numerous student-written commen-
taries have been published comparing the standards adopted in different
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Bezak, Note, DNA Profiling Evidence: The Need
for a Uniform and Workable Evidentiary Standard of Admissibility, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
595 (1992); Daniel C. Burke & BrianJ. Whiteman, Note, Argue with Science? The
Admissibility Debate Surrounding DNA Identification, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
597 (1992).
124. See, e.g., State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 505 & n.2 (Wash. 1993).
125. See, e.g., Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. 1991) (adopting
relevancy test). According to the Prater court, the "relevancy" approach is based
upon the Uniform Rules of Evidence and requires a three-fold analysis by the
court before testimony advancing novel scientific evidence will be admitted. Id.
The court must inquire into "(1) the reliability of the novel process used to gen-
erate the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would over-
whelm, confuse or mislead the jury, and (3) the connection between the novel
process evidence to be offered and the disputed factual issues in the particular
case." Id.
1640 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
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tro. 12 6 The "general acceptance" test for the admissibility of novel sci-
entific evidence was first announced in Frye v. United States.12 7 Under the
F ye test, novel scientific evidence may only be admitted if its proponent
can establish that it is based on scientific principles that have gained
"general acceptance" within the relevant scientific community.1 28
Under the relevancy test, the court admits scientific evidence whenever
its proponent can demonstrate that it is reliable, will not confuse or mis-
lead the jury and is related to the facts at issue. 12 9 The Castro court
created its test specifically to consider the admissibility of forensic DNA
evidence. Under the Castro test, forensic DNA evidence is admissible if
its proponent can demonstrate that the theory underlying it is generally
accepted in the scientific community, that DNA testing can produce reli-
able results and that the DNA testing procedures were correctly per-
formed in producing the evidence sought to be admitted.' 3 0
After it was announced in 1923, a majority ofjurisdictions adopted
the Frye test. 13 1 By 1991, however, approximately one third ofjurisdic-
126. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987-88 (Sup. Ct. 1989). The Cas-
tro test, which is an extension of the Frye test, asks three questions:
Prong I. Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scien-
tific community, which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic test-
ing can produce reliable results?
Prong H. Are there techniques or experiments that currently exist
that are capable of producing reliable results in DNA identification and
which are generally accepted in the scientific community?
Prong III. Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific
techniques in analyzing the forensic samples in this particular case?
Id. at 987.
127. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye court
stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
128. See JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (4th ed.
1992); see also Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 101-08 (discussing admissibil-
ity of DNA evidence under Frye standard); DiRusso, supra note 91, at 191-96
(same).
129. Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. 1991). The Prater court
considered reliability to be the "critical element" of the relevancy test. Id.
130. See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987-88 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
131. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2792
(1993) ("In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye case, the "general ac-
ceptance" test has been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility
of novel scientific evidence at trial."); United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191,
1195 (8th Cir. 1993); Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429,431 (Ark. 1991); Thomp-
son & Ford, supra note 2, at 53; DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 132 (stating
that Frye test "has been the most frequently invoked one in American case law").
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tions had rejected Fye and adopted the "relevancy" approach.13 2 Re-
cently, a few states have applied the stricter Castro test in considering the
admissibility of DNA identification evidence.' 33
In the federal system, the Supreme Court recently clarified the issue
of the applicable test for the admissibility of scientific testimony in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1-4 In Daubert, the Court held
that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the Frye rule.'3 5 The
Court suggested that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 necessitated a two-
pronged inquiry into "whether the reasoning or methodology underly-
ing the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."' 3 6 The only
United States Court of Appeals to rule on the admissibility of DNA iden-
tification evidence since Daubert was the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Martinez.' 3 7 In Martinez, the
132. Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. 1991).
133. People v. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (applying Cas-
tro three-prong test); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987-88 (Sup. Ct.
1989). At least one other state has adopted a test for the admissibility of DNA
identification evidence that is substantially similar to the Castro test. Ex parte
Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 250 (Ala. 1991). But see People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d
197, 197 n.2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (rejecting Castro court's conclusion that idi-
osyncracies of DNA analysis make Frye "general acceptance" test inadequate),
afd, No. 18, 1994 WL 99513 (N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994).
134. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
135. Id. at 2793-94.
136. Id. at 2796. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: "If scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702. The Daubert Court inter-
preted Rule 702 to require the offered evidence to meet "a standard of eviden-
tiary reliability" that, in the case of scientific evidence, is based upon "scientific
validity." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 & n.9. The Court further held that Rule
702 "requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondi-
tion to admissibility." Id. at 2796.
137. United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993). Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, two United States Courts of Appeals had
ruled on the admissibility of DNA identification evidence, and each had applied
a different test. Compare United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794, 797-800
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992) with United States v. Two Bulls, 918
F.2d 56 (8th Cir.) (original panel decision was vacated and permission for re-
hearing en banc granted; case was dismissed as moot when defendant died),
dismissed, 925 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit based itsJakobetz
decision on a balancing test for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence
which it had announced in United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). Jahobetz, 955 F.2d at 794, 797-800. In
Williams, the court admitted voice spectrographic evidence after balancing its
probative value, materiality and reliability against its tendency to mislead the
jury. 583 F.2d at 1198-1200. InJakobetz, the Second Circuit declined to depart
from the Williams balancing approach in determining the admissibility of DNA
evidence and "balanc(ed] ... the reliability of the evidence against its potential
negative impact on the jury." Jahobetz, 955 F.2d at 794, 797-800.
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Eighth Circuit held that DNA identification evidence was admissible
under the Supreme Court's Daubert analysis.' 3 8 The court held that the
lower court had not abused its discretion in admitting the evidence after
conducting a hearing in which it applied the Castro test. 18 9 Before reach-
ing its holding, the Martinez court broadly discussed the Daubert Court's
approach to the admissibility of evidence under Rule 702 and character-
ized it as a flexible inquiry into reliability.' 40 The Martinez court then
took judicial notice of the Second Circuit's conclusions regarding the
reliability of the general theory and techniques of DNA testing and con-
cluded that they were valid under the Daubert admissibility analysis, but
cautioned that such notice did not make DNA identification evidence
In contrast, a panel opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit suggested that "[b]ecause DNA evidence is so new and the result-
ing prejudice to the defendant is sufficiently great," a stricter, three-prong test
should be used. Two Bulls, 981 F.2d at 60. In Two Bulls, the court described the
applicable test: "(1) whether the DNA evidence is scientifically acceptable, (2)
whether there are certain standard procedures that should be followed in con-
ducting these tests, and (3) whether these standards were followed in this case."
Id. at 61. This three-prong analysis is similar to the Castro test. See People v.
Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987-88 (Sup. Ct. 1989). The Two Bulls court further
expanded this inquiry in its instructions to the lower court on remand:
The trial court is to decide (1) whether DNA evidence is generally ac-
cepted by the scientific community, (2) whether the testing procedures
used in this case are generally accepted as reliable if performed prop-
erly, (3) whether the test was performed properly in this case, (4)
whether the evidence is more prejudicial than probative in this case,
and (5) whether the statistics used to determine the probability of
someone else having the same genetic characteristics is more probative
than prejudicial under Rule 403.
Two Bulls, 981 F.2d at 61.
138. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1198. The Martinez court identified four factors
which the Daubert Court had suggested courts consider in determining the relia-
bility of novel scientific evidence:
(1) Whether the scientific technique can be (and has been) tested.
(2) Whether the technique or theory has been subjected to peer
review and publication. While not a sine qua non of admissibility, "[t]he
fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal thus will
be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the sci-
entific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an
opinion is premised."
(3) The known rate of error of the technique and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation.
(4) Whether the technique is generally accepted.
Id. at 1196-97 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786, 2796 (1993)).
139. Id. at 1198. The Martinez court noted that the Castro inquiry was "at
least as stringent" as the inquiry mandated by the Supreme Court in Daubert. Id.
The Martinez court further held that under the doctrine of invited error, the de-
fendant was barred from arguing that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ex-
clusion of the expert's estimate of the probability of a coincidental match (1 in
2600) as more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 1199.
140. Id. at 1197.
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automatically admissible. 14 1 Noting that courts before Daubert had re-
quired additional inquiry into whether the expert had properly per-
formed the DNA analysis techniques, the Martinez court concluded that
the Daubert reliability inquiry mandated "a preliminary showing that the
expert properly performed a reliable methodology in arriving at his [or
her] opinion." 14 2 This controversy, regarding the appropriate inquiry
for a court faced with deciding whether to admit DNA identification evi-
dence, shows little sign of abating.
In a Fourth Amendment context, concerns regarding the reliability
and admissibility of DNA test results necessarily affect the strength of
the governmental interest in obtaining them. Similarly, the information
the DNA test results confer about the subject affects the privacy interests
of the persons being tested.
4. Privacy Concerns: The Information Conferred
Advocates of DNA identification evidence often dismiss its potential
infringement on personal privacy as insignificant.143 These commenta-
tors argue that present methods of DNA testing "yield[] no invasive,
substantive information."' 14 4 At present this is true; however, once
scientists fully map human DNA, 145 testing for the presence of genes
indicating a predisposition towards crime, drug addiction or genetic dis-
ease might also be undertaken. 14 6 If future refinements in DNA testing
141. Id. Further, the court held that as a result, courts could take judicial
notice of the reliability of DNA identification theory and techniques in the fu-
ture. Id (cautioning, however, that should new DNA analysis techniques be of-
fered into evidence, future courts would be required to hold admissibility
hearings under Daubert standard).
142. Id. at 1197-98.
143. See, e.g., Longobardi, supra note 3, at 331-32, 353. Ms. Longobardi
argues that DNA test results, "DNA prints," contain no substantive information
about the subject. Id at 331-32 (quoting Tyler Marshall, Scientific Technique Focus-
ing on DNA Aids British Police: 'Genetic Fingerprints' May Catch Killer, L.A. TIMEs,
Mar. 11, 1987, part I at 1, and noting that subject's sex, race and even species
are indeterminable from DNA print). She further contends that because DNA
analysis tests only for specific polymorphisms, it would be possible to create a
standardized DNA test that tested only for "benign" genetic sequences, those
that communicate no sensitive information about the subject. Id. at 353.
144. Id. at 338-39. Ms. Longobardi also points out that present DNA test
results indicate only "presence and length of certain highly variable and special-
ized nucleotide sequences." lId at 342.
145. Mark A. Rothstein, Foreword to Symposium: Legal and Ethical Issues Raised
by the Human Genome Project, 29 Hous. L. REv. 1, 1 (1992) ("In 1990 the United
States officially began the Human Genome Project, a fifteen-year scientific pro-
gram to map and sequence all of the estimated 50,000 to 100,000 genes within
each human being.").
146. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 2, at 50-51 (suggesting that future
DNA testing procedures, specifically "DNA sequencing," will provide "a direct
readout of the genetic code of DNA" and may become available for courtroom
use relatively soon); see also Rothstein, supra note 145, at 2 (suggesting that
gene-by-gene readout will be cheaply commercially available in thirty years
1644 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
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produce a gene-by-gene account of an individual's DNA, including those
genes that indicate race, appearance and predisposition to disease, an
individual's privacy interest in that information will accordingly in-
crease. 1 4 7 Even with the present technology, however, the donor has an
interest in the content of the DNA analysis because DNA test results
provide evidence of identity. 14 8 Moreover, even present day genetic
identity testing represents a greater intrusion into personal privacy than
do the alcohol and drug-use testing at issue in the Supreme Court cases
creating and applying the "special needs" test. 149
5. DNA Databases
In its report entitled DNA Technology in Forensic Science,150 a commit-
tee of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sci-
ences discussed the possibility of the creation of a database or databases
(quoting ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE HUMAN BLUEPRINT 271 (1991)). But see Burk,
supra note 104, at 93 (asserting that DNA sequencing of major portions of sus-
pect's genome, not merely those used for DNA identification, "might constitute
a very real threat to genetic privacy, but is very unlikely to occur" because "[n]o
law enforcement agency is likely to commit" resources necessary).
147. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 113. The authors of DNA TECH-
NOLOGY observe: "DNA typing can, in principle, also provide personal informa-
tion [in addition to identity]-concerning medical characteristics, physical traits,
and relatedness-that carries with it risks of discrimination. Consequently, DNA
typing raises considerably greater issues of privacy than does ordinary finger-
printing." Id. But see Burk, supra note 104, at 90 ("As a general rule, the pattern
[produced by DNA analysis] will not be useful for purposes besides identifica-
tion. In this respect, it is very much like the fingerprint patterns or photographic
images of criminals now kept by law enforcement agencies." (citation omitted)).
Mr. Burk extensively analyzed the various threats to privacy posed by present
DNA identification technology and concluded that the dire warnings of other
commentators are unwarranted. Id. at 93-100.
148. See DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 114 (explaining why "[e]ven
simple information about identity requires confidentiality"); Burk, supra note
104, at 90 (indicating that banding pattern produced by DNA analysis is useful
only for identification purposes). In fact, the Commonwealth of Virginia con-
ducted the DNA testing at issue in Jones specifically in order to identify the pris-
oners genetically. See VA. STAT. ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (authorizing blood samples to
be taken for DNA testing "to determine identification characteristics specific to
the person"). But seeJones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir.) (recognizing
that DNA analysis results contain information concerning identity but asserting
that once arrested, prisoner no longer has any protected privacy interest in his
or her identity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992).
149. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20
(1989) (using "special needs" test to uphold post-accident blood and urine drug
tests of railway employees); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (using "special needs" test to uphold blood and
urine drug tests of Customs officials involved in drug interdiction or required to
carry firearms).
150. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCI-
ENCE (1992). For an initial assessment of this report, see DonJ. DeBenedictis,
DNA Report Raises Concerns, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 20.
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of DNA analyses for use in later criminal investigations. 15 The authors
of DNA Technology compared DNA profiles to latent fingerprints in order
to "identify key issues pertinent to the establishment of DNA
data[bases]."' 5 2 The report identified several features that distinguish
DNA profiles from latent fingerprints.1 58 First, the authors noted that
bodily fluids, or other DNA testable material, are found at far fewer
crime scenes than latent fingerprints.1 5 4 Second, unlike fingerprints,
the pattern on the autoradiograph that constitutes the DNA profile var-
ies with the method of testing.1 5 5 Third, while the amount of informa-
tion available from a latent fingerprint varies with the amount of
evidence recovered, the amount of information available from DNA test-
able evidence varies instead with the test applied.1 5 6 Fourth, as DNA
analysis now stands, fingerprints are more individual than DNA pro-
files. 15 7 Fifth, obtaining fingerprints is far less "intrusive, costly and dif-
ficult" than taking a blood sample for DNA analysis.1 58 Finally, DNA
analysis represents a greater intrusion on an individual than fingerprint-
ing and can provide much greater personal information.1 59
151. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 111-30. Although DA Technology
mentions the possibility of DNA analyses for the entire population being stored
in databases, this Note focuses only on databases of DNA test results from
known offenders. See id at 121-22 (rejecting arguments in favor of database of
DNA profiles from all members of general population).
152. Id. at 111.
153. Id at 112-13.
154. Id. at 112. As a result, latent fingerprints will be relevant evidence in a
greater variety of crimes. Id. However, where present, DNA identification evi-
dence is likely to be far more inculpatory because the presence of the suspect's
bodily fluids at the crime scene is more difficult to assign to an innocent cause.
Id.
155. Id. The authors further note that the profiles produced by different
tests cannot be readily translated for comparison. Id. To be as constant and
complete a physical pattern as a fingerprint, a DNA analysis would have to be
capable of sequencing the entire three billion-gene sequence of an individual's
DNA. Id
156. Id. at 112-13 (explaining that while amount of fingerprint evidence de-
pends on portion of finger(s) indicated by prints found, amount of DNA evi-
dence depends on number of polymorphisms tested for).
157. Id at 113. For a discussion of the reasons why the weight of DNA
identification evidence must be expressed as the probability of a coincidence and
of the difficulties associated with the statistical assumptions underlying that
probability, see supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
158. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supa note 2, at 113 (noting far less training re-
quired for persons taking fingerprints as compared with those taking blood sam-
ples and performing DNA analysis). On the other hand, the authors of DNA
Technology note further that while obtaining DNA profiles is more costly than
obtaining fingerprints, computerization of DNA profiles for rapid comparison
within a database is relatively inexpensive. Id.; see id. at 117-18 (performing
cost/benefit analysis of DNA databanks).
159. Id at 117-18. For a discussion of the information conveyed by DNA
analysis, see supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text. The authors of DNA
Technology emphasize the threat to privacy posedby a computerized database of
DNA profiles. Id. at 114 ("DNA identification information could be misused to
1646 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
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Taking rapidly changing DNA technology into account, the authors
of DNA Technology considered the creation of a national database unwar-
ranted at that time because they believed that present RFLP technology
would shortly be replaced by new technology that would be cheaper,
simpler and easier to automate but wholly incompatible with RFLP.
6 0
The authors of DNA Technology also found that in view of the expense of
creating and maintaining DNA databases, "[t]o maximize the 'return per
sample,' one should concentrate on persons convicted of crimes with
documented high rates of recidivism."' 16 1 Based on their analysis of the
available recidivism statistics, the authors of DNA Technology concluded
that "[a] DNA profile databank would thus be valuable primarily in in-
vestigating forcible rape" and ought to be made up of profiles of violent
sex offenders and unknown subjects. 16 2 In Jones v. Murray,16 3 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit faced the issue of
whether the government's interest in creating a database of DNA
profiles of all convicted felons justified non-consensual testing in order
to create such a database. 16
search and correlate criminal-record databanks or medical-record databanks.").
They recommend that "[g]uidelines for release of DNA samples and disclosure
of DNA typing information... be designed to safeguard the rights of persons
who, for one reason or another, get involved in a DNA typing" and cited provi-
sions of the Virginia law at issue inJones as an example of legislative attempts to
deal with the problem. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-31.6 (Michie 1990)).
160. Id at 116. They warn that "[p]remature development of a national
databank based on current RFLP typing methods runs the risk of perpetuating a
'dinosaur' technology in the face of better techniques." Id.
161. Id. at 118. The authors of DNA Technology further contend that "DNA
profile databanks containing profiles of criminal offenders must be justified on
the basis of the likelihood of recidivism." Id.
162. Id. at 120. The authors of DNA Technology noted the high rates of re-
cidivism indicated by a Bureau ofJustice Statistics study of prisoners released in
1983. Id. at 118-20 (citing ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN
1983 1, 3 (1989)). They proceeded to a two-part analysis of whether these statis-
tics justified the inclusion of DNA profiles of all convicted persons in a database.
Id. at 119-20 (answering two questions: "What fraction of crimes committed by
repeat offenders do not themselves lead to rearrest and reconviction?" and
"What fraction would end in rearrest and reconviction if a DNA profile databank
were available?"). Initially, the authors of DNA Technology noted that rape is the
exception to the general observation that "crimes of most types will not afford
the opportunity to recover relevant biological evidence that will allow the police
to identify an unknown suspect-i.e., the perpetrator's own bodily fluids." Id at
120. The authors of DNA Technology then concluded that their analysis of the
recidivism statistics justified "the development of a databank of DNA profiles of
unknown subjects (open cases) and of offenders convicted of violent sex
crimes." Id.
163. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Gir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472
(1992).
164. Id. at 303.
164719931 NOTE
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Reasoning of the Jones Majority
In Jones v. Murray,16 5 the court held that "the Fourth Amendment
does not require... individualized suspicion before blood can be taken
from incarcerated felons for the purpose of [later] identifying them."' 166
InJones prisoners challenged the constitutionality of section 19.2-310.2
of the Virginia Code, 167 which required prisoners convicted of felonies
on or afterJuly 1, 1990, to submit to blood testing for DNA analysis "to
determine identification characteristics specific to the person."' 68 Six
prisoners, represented by an attorney from the Post Conviction Assist-
ance Project of the University of Virginia School of Law, assisted by
three third-year law students, asserted that involuntary extraction of
blood for DNA analysis constituted an unreasonable search prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment. 169
The prisoner-plaintiffs argued that in order to be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, a search for law enforcement purposes must be
based upon some degree of individualized suspicion.' 70 They further
argued that the government's generalized interest in improving identifi-
cation techniques based solely on recidivism statistics was insufficient to
justify testing all prisoners convicted of felonies.17 1 In response, the
Commonwealth of Virginia contended that because the DNA database is
165. Id. at 302.
166. Id. at 306-07.
167. Id. at 303. Section 19.2-310.2 of the Virginia Code provides:
Blood sample required for DNA analysis upon conviction of a fel-
ony. - Every person convicted of a felony on or afterJuly 1, 1990, and
every person convicted of a felony offense under Article 7 (§ 18.2-61 et
seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2 who was incarcerated on July 1, 1989,
shall have a sample of his blood taken for DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
analysis to determine identification characteristics specific to the per-
son. The analysis shall be performed by the Division of Forensic Sci-
ence, Department of General Services. The identification characteris-
tics of the profile resulting from the DNA analysis shall be stored and
maintained by the Division in a DNA data bank and shall be made avail-
able only as provided in § 19.2-310.5.
AfterJuly 1, 1990, the blood sample shall be taken prior to release
from custody.
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 53.1-159, any person con-
victed of a felony who is in custody afterJuly 1, 1990, shall provide a
blood sample prior to his release. Every person so convicted afterJuly
1, 1990, who is not sentenced to a term of confinement shall provide a
blood sample as a condition of such sentence.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie Supp. 1993).
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2.
169. Jones, 962 F.2d at 303.
170. Id. at 305.
171. Id. The prisoner-plaintiffs argued that without a requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion, law enforcement officials could justify searches of other
classes of persons, for example those suffering from mental disease, based on
recidivism statistics alone. Id.
1648
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intended to aid in solving future crimes, it is impossible to demonstrate
individualized suspicion in this situation. 17 2 The Commonwealth fur-
ther argued that its interest in establishing a database of DNA test re-
sults was a "special need" under Skinner- that justified the searches
without need for any individualized suspicion. 173
The Jones majority responded to these arguments by choosing to
view Fourth Amendment cases concerning prisoners as a discrete cate-
gory to which the usual requirement of probable cause did not apply,
dismissing the "special needs" test in a footnote. 174 In order to justify
its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not require individual-
ized suspicion for the state to conduct a blood test on its prisoners, 175
the majority suggested that prisoners have few, if any, rights under the
172. Id. Similarly, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, the Court
pointed out that a requirement of individualized suspicion was impractical in the
circumstances. 489 U.S. 602, 631 (1989). The Court stated: "It would be un-
realistic, and inimical to the Government's goal of ensuring safety in rail trans-
portation, to require a showing of individualized suspicion in these circum-
stances." Id. The Skinner Court upheld suspicionless drug tests of railroad
employees following an accident. Id. at 633-34.
In its argument in Jones, the Commonwealth relied on two studies of re-
leased prisoners that demonstrated high rates of recidivism among convicted
felons. Jones, 962 F.2d at 306 (citing ALLENJ. BECK & BERNARD SHIPLEY, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN
1983 1, 3 (1989); DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINALJUSTICE SERVS., VIOLENT CRIME IN
VIRGINIA, 1, 30-33 (1989)). The Commonwealth used these studies to support
its argument that a database of DNA identifications of convicted felons might aid
in identifying the perpetrators of future crimes. Jones, 962 F.2d at 306. The
court noted that one federal study indicated that 62.5% of prisoners released in
1983 were rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three years. Id.
(quoting ALLENJ. BECK & BERNARD SHIPLEY, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS SPE-
CIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, 1, 1 (1989)). The
Jones court further noted that "[i]n Virginia the statistics are not significantly
different." Id (citing DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINALJUSTICE SERVS., VIOLENT CRIME
IN VIRGINIA 1, 30-31 (1989)).
173. Id. at 305. The District Court inJones had upheld the Virginia law
based on its conclusion that blood testing of prisoners for identification pur-
poses fell within the "special needs" test. Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842,
844-48 (W.D. Va. 1991), aff'd in part, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 472 (1992).
174. Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 & n.2 (noting that Fourth Amendment prison-
ers' rights cases "comprise a separate category of cases to which the usual per se
requirement of probable cause does not apply" and that there was "no cause to
address whether the so-called 'special needs' exception, [to the probable cause
requirement] . . . applie[d] in this case"). TheJones majority cited no authority
for the proposition that the probable cause requirement does not apply to
searches of prisoners, but found support for its position in the fact that the
Supreme Court had never expressly required a finding of some degree of indi-
vidualized suspicion for any law enforcement search. Id.
175. Id. at 306. The majority first acknowledged that under Schmerber v. Cal-
Ifornia, a blood test is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). The court also noted that it knew of no
case requiring any degree of suspicion for a limited search conducted by govern-
ment officials for the purpose of identifying a prisoner. Id
1993] NOTE 1649
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Fourth Amendment. 176 The majority cited Bell v. Wolfish 1 77 and Hudson
v. Palmer17 8 as examples of the degree to which Fourth Amendment pro-
tections can be lost by an individual's contact with the criminal justice
system.179 Following these examples, the Jones court held that in a
prison "blood testing can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
... where the slight intrusion is outweighed by the governmental inter-
est advanced by the intrusion."1 8 0
The court then applied this balancing test to determine the reasona-
bleness of non-consensual blood testing for DNA analysis.' 8 ' First, the
Jones court identified, and minimized, the intrusion on the prisoners' pri-
vacy interests.' 8 2 Next, the majority emphasized the importance of the
government interest in creating a database of DNA test results to aid law
enforcement in solving future crimes.1 8 3 In response to the prisoner-
plaintiffs' argument regarding the small statistical likelihood of non-vio-
lent felons committing future crimes in which DNA evidence could be
used, the majority suggested potential additional uses of DNA identifica-
tion information, such as identifying felons who had changed their ap-
176. Id. ("With the person's loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at
least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the
Fourth Amendment."); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979) ("It may
well be argued that a person confined in a detention facility has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell and that therefore the
Fourth Amendment provides no protection for such a person.").
177. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
178. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
179. Jones, 962 F.2d at 306 (holding that prisoner can have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in prison cell (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530
(1984)); see Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-60 (upholding visual body cavity searches of
pretrial detainees).
180. Jones, 962 F.2d at 307. In creating this test, the majority considered
Dunn v. White, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
upheld taking blood samples from prisoners without their consent in order to
test for the presence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Dunn v. White,
880 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990). In
Dunn, the government interest held to outweigh the prisoner's privacy interest
had a penal purpose: to gather information on and to prevent the spread of
AIDS in the prison population. Id. at 1195. The Jones dissent correctly noted
that the Commonwealth had asserted no similar penal considerations in that
case. Jones, 962 F.2d at 313 n.2 (Murnaghan,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Furthermore, a careful reading reveals that the Dunn court applied
the "special needs" test from Skinner, which the Jones court stated did not apply.
Compare Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1193 with Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 n.2. For a complete
discussion of Dunn v. White, see supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
181. Jones, 962 F.2d at 307.
182. Id. The majority emphasized that the procedure "involves virtually no
risk, trauma, or pain." I. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771
(1966))).
183. Id. Citing no authority, the majority suggested that where traditional
methods of identification failed, DNA testing would provide a "dramatic new
tool for the law enforcement effort to match suspects and criminal conduct." Id.
1650 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
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pearance.18 4 In response to the prisoner-plaintiffs' argument that the
government's interest was more compelling as applied to violent felons
than non-violent felons, the court stated: "It is not for us to weigh the
advantages of one method of identification over another which is se-
lected by the Commonwealth."18 5 Citing Michigan Department of State Po-
lice v. Sitz18 6 and Bell v. Woflsh,' 8 7 theJones court reasoned that particular
law enforcement techniques need not be highly effective, provided that
the intrusion on constitutionally-protected privacy interests was
small.188 Balancing the governmental and privacy interests accordingly,
the court concluded that the intrusion represented by DNA testing was
justified by the governmental interest and thus did not offend the Fourth
Amendment.' 8 9
To bolster this conclusion, theJones majority analogized DNA test-
ing to fingerprinting.1 90 The court reasoned that at arrest a person's
identity becomes of legitimate interest to law enforcement officials and
therefore he or she can no longer claim a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in it. 191 The court concluded that because prisoners have dimin-
ished expectations of privacy by virtue of their incarceration, DNA
testing of prisoners was an acceptable law enforcement technique which,
184. Id. ("Even a suspect with altered physical features cannot escape the
match that his DNA might make with a sample contained in a DNA bank. ... ").
185. Id. at 308. The majority suggested two reasons for allowing DNA tests
of non-violent felons: that DNA test results might be useful for identifying crim-
inal suspects who attempt to conceal their identities and that as DNA testing
became more common, and law enforcement officials became more aware of its
potential, it could be used in solving crimes other than murder and rape. Id.
186. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-56 (1990).
187. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
188. Jones, 962 F.2d at 308 (holding that effectiveness of a particular law
enforcement technique need not be great "where the objective is significant and
the privacy intrusion limited," citing Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 454-56 (1990) and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
189. Id. at 307 (weighing "minor" intrusion on prisoners' privacy against
government's interest in "preserving a permanent identification record of con-
victed felons"). The court concluded that Virginia's interest outweighed the
prisoners' interests. Id.
190. Id The court stated that "governmental justification for this form of
identification, therefore relies on no argument different in kind from that tradi-
tionally advanced for taking fingerprints .... but with additional force because of
the potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching methods." Id.
For another perspective on the comparison between DNA identification evi-
dence and fingerprints by the authors of DNA Technology, see supra notes 152-64
and accompanying text.
191. Jones, 962 F.2d at 306. The court referred to the "universal approba-
tion" accorded fingerprinting all arrestees as a means of identification. Id It
contrasted the treatment of arrestees with that of free persons, who cannot be
fingerprinted without some Fourth Amendment restraint. Id. (citing Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (requiring some Fourth Amendment pro-
tection before free person may be fingerprinted, but allowing for possibility that
required protection amount to less than probable cause)).
19931 NOTE 1651
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like fingerprinting, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.19 2
In his separate opinion,19 3 Judge Mumaghan disagreed with the
majority in three respects. First, he concluded that the majority's rea-
soning unnecessarily reduced a prisoner's Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to nearly zero. 19 4 Second, Judge Murnaghan quarrelled with the
majority's interpretation of the prisoners' rights cases and suspicionless
search cases to authorize use of a simple balancing test to determine the
reasonableness of a non-consensual blood test in the prison context. 195
Third, Judge Murnaghan concluded that under proper Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, the state had failed tojustify the DNA testing of convicted
non-violent felons.
196
Judge Murnaghan's first point of difference with the majority con-
192. I. at 306-07. "As with fingerprinting, therefore, we find that the
Fourth Amendment does not require an additional finding of individualized sus-
picion before blood can be taken from incarcerated felons for the purpose of
identifying them." Id.
193. Id. at 311 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Judge Murnaghan concurred in the majority holding that Virginia's DNA testing
statute operated as an ex post facto law in purporting to alter Virginia's
mandatory parole statute. Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). He also concurred in the majority's holding that the Virginia
mandatory DNA testing statute was constitutional as applied to violent felons.
Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Murnaghan's dissent was limited to the majority's holding that the statute was
constitutional as applied to non-violent felons. Id (Murnaghan,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that "I must respectfully dissent from the
majority's determination of the constitutionality of the statute as applied to pris-
oners convicted of non-violent crimes").
194. Id. (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
"majority's strikingly truncated view of the Fourth Amendment protections af-
forded to a convicted felon"); cf. id. at 306 (majority opinion) ("With the per-
son's loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to
personal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.") (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court has never gone so far. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 528 (1984) (implying that prisoner has expectation of privacy although
it must always yield to "paramount interest in institutional security"). More-
over, theJones court was bound by Schmerber v. California, which held that a blood
test is a search under the Fourth Amendment. 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (Blood
tests "plainly constitute searches of 'persons,' . . . within the meaning of [the
Fourth] Amendment.").
195. Jones, 962 F.2d at 311-13 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
196. Id. at 311 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
He summarized his position as follows:
To the extent that the majority opinion upholds the Virginia DNA
testing procedure as applied to violent felons .... I concur in the deci-
sion. But I must respectfully dissent from the majority's determination
of the constitutionality of the statute as applied to prisoners convicted
of non-violent crimes. Prisoners do not lose an expectation of privacy
with regard to blood testing, and the Commonwealth's articulated in-
terest in the testing of non-violent felons does not counter-balance the
privacy violation involved in the procedure.
Id. (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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cerned the weight of the prisoners' asserted privacy interest.1 9 7 Judge
Mumaghan interpreted Supreme Court precedent to indicate that pris-
oners retained those Fourth Amendment rights that are not inconsistent
with their incarceration.1 9 8 He contended that the majority had read
Bell and Hudson too broadly.' 9 9 In support of this view, Judge
Murnaghan quoted the Supreme Court in Skinner: "[I]t is obvious that
197. Id. at 312 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[B]lood testing[] violates a privacy interest that even a prisoner, living in close
quarters under constant security surveillance, reasonably can expect to enjoy.").
198. Id. at 312-13 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). "[P]risoners [must] be accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsis-
tent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarcera-
tion." Id. at 313 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984)). Judge Murnaghan dis-
tinguished a prisoner's privacy interest in being free from non-consensual DNA
analysis from those privacy interests that are relinquished in the prison context
because "no practical penal concern justifies the departure involved in the DNA
[testing] procedure." Id. at 312 (Murnaghan,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Judge Murnaghan acknowledged, however, that Supreme Court
precedent existed indicating that in some situations "a private citizen's expecta-
tion of privacy diminishes, or disappears altogether." Id. at 312 & n.1
(Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. Id. at 312 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The majority reasoned that because body cavity searches were upheld in Bell,
and random searches of prison cells were upheld in Hudson, that prisoners'
residual privacy protection was minimal. Id at 306 (Murnaghan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Judge Murnaghan, however, pointed out that the
Court in Bell had reiterated that prisoners retained some privacy rights. Id. at
312 (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979)). But see Bell, 441 U.S. at 556-57 (noting pos-
sible argument that prisoners have no reasonable expectations of privacy and
assuming for sake of argument that prisoners retain some privacy rights).
Judge Murnaghan further noted the majority's conclusion that under Hud-
son, prisoners lose Fourth Amendment protection from all routine searches. Id.
at 312 (Murnaghan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)). He disagreed with the majority's extension of
that conclusion in applying the Hudson standard to searches of prisoners' bodily
fluids. Id. (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Murnaghan considered the majority's reliance on Hudson misplaced because
prisoners retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bodily fluids,
which was not inconsistent with their incarceration. Id. at 312-13 (Murnaghan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In his dissent, Judge Murnaghan also disagreed with the majority's reliance
on Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). Jones, 962 F.2d at 313
(Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority cited
Griffin for the proposition that probationers "lose the protection of the Fourth
Amendment with respect to their right of privacy against searches of their home
pursuant to an established program to ensure rehabilitation and security." Id. at
306 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987)). Judge Murnaghan
distinguished the searches at issue in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880
(1987), which were carried out pursuant to reasonable suspicion, from the
searches at issue inJones, which were conducted without any individualized sus-
picion whatsoever. Id at 313 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that both sides had conceded that no individualized suspicion
had motivated searches at issue).
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this physical invasion [a blood test] penetrating beneath the skin, in-
fringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable." 200 Unlike the majority, Judge Murnaghan believed that
even a prisoner does not lose a reasonable expectation of privacy be-
neath the skin. 201
Judge Murnaghan's second point of departure concerned the ap-
propriate test to apply to the testing at issue inJones.20 2 Unlike the ma-
jority, which applied a simple balancing test derived from the prisoner
cases, Judge Murnaghan concluded that the correct test to apply was
that used in Sitz.203 The Sitz test consists of three factors to be balanced:
1) the privacy interest of the individual, 2) the state's interest in the par-
ticular law enforcement technique and 3) the degree to which the tech-
nique advances the state's interest in law enforcement.20 4 Using this
test, Judge Murnaghan agreed with the majority that DNA testing was
justified for violent felons, but disagreed regarding testing of non-vio-
lent felons.20 5
200. Jones, 962 F.2d at 312 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
616 (1989) (bracketed material added by Judge Murnaghan)). Judge
Murnaghan attributed to Skinner a determination that "an individual has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy within one's own body" and found that it "ap-
plie[d] equally to prisoners, unless the prisoner's privacy right is incompatible
with the objectives of incarceration." Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
201. Id. at 311 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Murnaghan made his point emphatically:
Although it has been established that incarcerated individuals, particu-
larly because of a partial loss of an expectation of privacy, must carry on
their affairs under a significantly limited umbrella of protections against
most searches, there exists no blanket authorization of searches involv-
ing intrusions under the skin, for which no individual, whether in
prison or out, loses a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. Id. at 313 (Murnaghan J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(advocating use of three-prong Sitz test). For a discussion of the test applied by
the 'majority, see supra notes 165-92 and accompanying text.
203. Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 & n.2 (majority announcing simple balancing
test); id. at 313 (Murnaghan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advo-
cating use of Sitz test). Judge Murnaghan noted that "[i]t is with a reasoned
application of the Sitz standard, and not with a disturbing restriction of the
Fourth Amendment protections afforded to the nation's prisoners, that the DNA
testing procedure, as applied to felons convicted of violent crime, may be justi-
fied." Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
Judge Murnaghan described the Sitz test: "Justification for searches of these in-
dividuals must be based, as must all searches of citizens in a free society still
clinging to disappearing Fourth Amendment protections, on a balancing of the
privacy interest involved against the state interest in the search to determine
which interest is more compelling." Jones, 962 F.2d at 313 (Murnaghan,J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
205. Jones, 962 F.2d at 315 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Regarding violent felons, Judge Murnaghan found a "sufficiently
1654
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Judge Murnaghan's third point of departure from the majority con-
cerned the state's attempted justification of the intrusion on the prison-
ers' privacy interests.20 6 Judge Murnaghan stressed that the only
interest offered by the Commonwealth to justify the testing of non-vio-
lent felons was administrative ease.2 07 He also emphasized that DNA
testing of non-violent felons was likely to have only a negligible benefit
for solving future crimes.2 0 8 He referred to statistical evidence that in-
dicated that although DNA-testable material, such as blood or other
bodily fluids, is found at 30% of crime scenes, 97% of the cases in which
DNA evidence identified a criminal were murders or rapes.
2 0 9 There-
reasonable connection between the DNA testing procedure and the government
interest in better identifying future criminals" to make the search reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Id (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
206. Id at 313 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("I cannot conclude [as did the majority] that the government interest in admin-
istrative ease suffices to outweigh a prisoner's expectation of privacy .... ").
207. Id. (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Murnaghan discussed the legislative history of the Virginia DNA testing statute.
Id. at 314 (Murnaghan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). According
to Judge Murnaghan, the legislative committee concluded that although the sta-
tistics on recidivism only supported the testing of violent felons, non-violent
felons should also be tested to make the DNA database "more efficient and cost
effective." Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMIrEE STUDYING CREATION OF A DNA TEST
BANK, SENATE REPORT No. 29 (1990)). Judge Murnaghan pointed out that "such
a justification [cost efficiency] for testing non-violent felons is based on a tenu-
ous state concern which could just as readily justify the testing of any citizen, so
long as inclusion of that individual [in the group to be tested] served to lessen
the Commonwealth's administrative workload." Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
208. Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Murnaghan examined the recidivism statistics upon which the lower court and
the majority relied to support their assumption that testing non-violent felons
would assist the solution of future crimes. Id. (Murnaghan,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Judge Murnaghan emphasized the "extremely tenuous
link" between non-violent felons and future violent crime demonstrated by the
statistics available in the Record. Id. (Murnaghan,J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Judge Murnaghan believed that it could be "readily inferred"
from the information at hand that a DNA database of all citizens would demon-
strate a similar statistical likelihood of solving future crimes. Id. (Murnaghan,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of the perspective of
the authors of DNA Technology on the usefulness of a national DNA database, see
supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
209. Jones, 962 F.2d at 314 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (referring to study mentioned as having been presented by prisoner-
plaintiffs, but providing no citation). The majority had suggested that as DNA
testing became more prevalent and more accepted, law enforcement would find
ways to "make use of the DNA clues that are left as a result of crimes other than
murder or rape." Id. at 308 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). This optimistic prediction runs contrary to the conclusions of the Na-
tional Research Council's Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science,
whose report was published in 1992. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 120.
The Committee report notes that "it is clear that crimes of most types will not
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fore, as applied to non-violent felons, Judge Murnaghan considered the
asserted governmental interest in administrative convenience wholly in-
sufficient to justify the intrusion represented by DNA testing.2 10
C. Where the Jones Court Went Wrong
There are three major difficulties with theJnes court's resolution of
the issue of the constitutionality of non-consensual DNA testing of pris-
oners. First, instead of using the "special needs" test, the Jones majority
looked only to prisoner cases and applied a simple balancing test. Sec-
ond, even within this test, the court unduly minimized the prisoners'
privacy interests at stake. Finally, the reasoning of the Jones majority re-
lied on an uncrifical analogy between fingerprinting and DNA testing as
methods of identification.
Rather than apply the "special needs" test from Skinner to deter-
mine when a search may be constitutionally conducted without individu-
alized suspicion, the Jones majority chose to restrict its frame of
reference to the prisoner cases and to further narrow the protection af-
forded prisoners by the Fourth Amendment.2 1 ' Although the Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue of the constitutionality of blood test-
ing for DNA analysis, the Fourth Circuit could have followed the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Dunn v. White2 12 and applied the "special needs"
test.2 13 TheJones court could even have reached the same conclusion by
applying the "special needs" test.2 14 The "special needs" test may not
afford the opportunity to recover relevant biological evidence that will allow the
police to identify an unknown suspect-i.e. the perpetrator's own bodily fluids."
Id. (noting that rape is major exception and that useful biological samples are
also recovered in "a small minority of homicides").
210. Jones, 962 F.2d at 315 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
211. For a discussion of the majority's reasoning, see supra notes 165-92
and accompanying text.
212. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1059 (1990). For a complete discussion of Dunn v. White, see supra notes 77-85
and accompanying text.
213. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)
(defining "special needs" test (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987))).
The Court described the "special needs" test: "When faced with such special
needs [that are beyond the normal needs of law enforcement,] we have not hesi-
tated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality
of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular context." Id.
For a further discussion of the "special needs" test, see supra notes 58-62.
214. SeeJones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842, 844-48 (W.D. Va. 1991) (up-
holding compulsory testing statute at issue using "special needs" test) (Jones 1),
afd in part, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert denied., 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992). To uphold
the Jones statute under the "special needs" test, the court could first have justi-
fied DNA testing of felons in order to create a database, which would aid in
identifying criminals using new DNA technology, as a "special need" of law en-
forcement. See id. at 845 (holding creation of database "can be classified as a
special need even if the [database] will be used in solving future crimes"); see
also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 872, 873-74 (1987) (giving examples of such
1656 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
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be appropriate to theJones facts, however, because the Supreme Court
has implicitly suggested that it is restricted to the civil setting.2 15 None-
theless, expanding the "special needs" test to the criminal context,
rather than establishing a new simple balancing test for the prison set-
ting, would have been a less drastic change and would have provided
better guidance for future courts faced with this issue.
Aside from the test it ultimately applied, theJnes court's reasoning
had a second, graver flaw: it unduly minimized the prisoners' privacy
interests and overstated the governmental interest with respect to non-
violent felons.21 6 Judge Murnaghan found that non-violent felons were
"not significantly more likely to commit a violent crime in the future
than ... member[s] of the general population.1217 Under the "special
"special needs" including "operation of a probation system .... of a school,
government office or prison, or... supervision of a regulated industry"). See
generally People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Albany County Ct. 1988)
(describing forensic DNA testing as potentially "greatest advance in the 'search
for truth,' and the goal of convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, since
the advent of cross-examination"), afd, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (App. Div. 1992),
afd, No. 18, 1994 WL 99513 (N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994); GENETIC WrrNESS, supra
note 2, at 17 (discussing advantages of DNA identification evidence); Longo-
bardi, supra note 3, at 350-57 (advocating creation of national DNA database);
cf. Tighten Rules for DNA Printing, NEWSDAY, June 14, 1992, sec. Currents at 27
(editorial generally supporting Governor's proposal for creation of New York
state DNA database, but advocating mandatory rather than voluntary compli-
ance with strict procedural standards).
Once such a "special need" is established, the court then must balance the
government's interest against the privacy interest being invaded. Skinner, 489
U.S. at 619 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). This is essen-
tially the same balancing that theJones majority undertook. Jones v. Murray, 962
F.2d 302, 310-11 (4th Cir.) (holding that Commonwealth's interest in law en-
forcement outweighs prisoners' privacy interests using simple balancing test),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992); cf. Jones 1, 763 F. Supp. at 848 (same, using
"special needs" test). For a discussion of theJones majority's analysis of the in-
terests involved, see supra notes 165-92 and accompanying text.
215. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668
(1989) (applying "special needs" test and concluding that Fourth Amendment
did not prohibit routine drug testing of Customs employees directly engaged in
drug interdiction or required to carry firearms). In reaching its decision, the Von
Raab Court pointed to the fact that the results of the drug tests at issue could not
be used in a criminal prosecution. Id. (noting that test results could be used in
criminal prosecution only with employee's consent). The Von Raab Court stated:
"Our cases teach, however, that the probable-cause standard 'is peculiarly re-
lated to criminal investigation.'" Id. at 667 (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370
n.5 (1976))). Moreover, this consideration would seem to mitigate in favor of
providing prisoners with more, not less, Fourth Amendment protection.
216. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 311 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (concluding that non-violent felons' privacy interests outweigh
state interest in DNA testing).
217. Id. at 313-14 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For Judge Mumaghan's discussion of the recidivism statistics cited by the
parties, see id. at 314-15 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
41
Love: Allowing New Technology to Erode Constitutional Protections: A Fo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
needs" test and Judge Murnaghan's analysis of the countervailing inter-
ests, the Virginia statute at issue in Jones should have been upheld as
applied to violent felons but struck down as applied to non-violent
felons because there is simply no statistical basis sufficient to justify the
attendant invasion of the privacy interests of non-violent felons.
A third difficulty with Jones was the court's unquestioning accept-
ance of the analogy between forensic DNA analysis and fingerprint-
ing.2 18 The court thus glossed over the procedural and statistical
problems associated with forensic DNA analysis.2 19 These problems
have been the subject of much scholarly debate and deserve careful con-
sideration by any court addressing the constitutionality of creating a
DNA database. 22 0 Moreover, as noted by the authors of DNA Technology,
blood testing and the ensuing DNA analysis represent a much greater
intrusion upon individual privacy than routine fingerprinting, 2 21 as even
the Jones majority admitted. 22 2 As the comparison of DNA profiling and
latent fingerprints demonstrates, the analogy oversimplifies the
strengths and weaknesses of the two technologies.2 2 3 Simply because
DNA testing is a technological advance beyond fingerprinting and pho-
tographs due to "the potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and
matching methods,"2 24 the governmental interest in performing these
tests does not, as the Jones majority asserted, necessarily outweigh the
greater intrusion that DNA testing represents.
Rather than recognize these fundamental differences between fin-
218. Id. at 306-07 ("As with fingerprinting, therefore, we find that the
Fourth Amendment does not require.., individualized suspicion before blood
can be taken from incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them.").
219. For a discussion of the procedural sources of error in forensic DNA
analysis, see supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
scientific debate oyer the statistical underpinnings of DNA identification evi-
dence, see supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
220. See United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 635-44 (D.C. 1992) (analyz-
ing in great detail defendant's challenge to admission of DNA evidence, includ-
ing lengthy discussion of statistical controversy surrounding forensic DNA
evidence). For example, a Washington, D.C., trial court recently held a twenty-
day hearing on the admissibility of DNA identification evidence during which
"the judge heard testimony from eight expert witnesses, admitted over 110 ex-
hibits, and received over 1,300 pages of briefs." Id at 630 (citing United States
v. Porter, 120 DAILY WASH. L. RPTR. 477 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1991) and excluding
DNA evidence in order and 93 page opinion).
221. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 113.
222. Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 (recognizing that "search effected by the taking
of a blood sample may be considered a greater intrusion than fingerprinting");
see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 779 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part)
("No clearer invasion of this right of privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)] can be imagined than forcible bloodletting of the
kind involved here.").
223. See DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 111-13. For a complete discus-
sion of the comparison between latent fingerprints and DNA profiles found in
DNA TECHNOLOGY, see supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
224. Jones, 962 F.2d at 307.
1658 [Vol. 38: p. 1617
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gerprinting and DNA testing, however, theJones court utilized the fin-
gerprinting analogy to suggest, then retreat from, the idea that DNA
testing does not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment. 225
TheJones majority suggested that prisoners retain no reasonable expec-
tations of privacy while incarcerated.2 26 Significantly, had the Jones
court found that DNA testing did not represent an intrusion into a pris-
oner's reasonable expectation of privacy, the DNA testing at issue
would not have amounted to a "search" 227 and the Fourth Amendment
would have imposed no limitation on government action.228 The
Supreme Court, however, has never gone so far. 229
V. IMPACT
When other courts address the question of whether non-consensual
DNA testing statutes like the one at issue in Jones violate the Fourth
Amendment, they will be faced with the alternatives of adopting the sim-
ple balancing test created by theJones majority or the "special needs"
test applied in Skinner.230 Given that the Supreme Court in Skinner de-
fined the "special needs" test to determine the circumstances under
which a governmental intrusion may be justified without a warrant or
probable cause, there is little need to define a new test for this context.
Similarly, because Jones unnecessarily further restricts the Fourth
Amendment protections of prisoners, courts faced with similar issues in
the future should hesitate to follow it in preference to Skinner.
225. See id. at 306-07.
226. Id. at 306 ("With the person's loss of liberty upon arrest comes the
loss of some, if not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the
Fourth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
227. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan,J., concur-
ring) (concluding that physical or electronic intrusion into area where one has
reasonable expectation of privacy is "search" in constitutional terms and is pre-
sumptively unreasonable unless conducted pursuant to search warrant).
228. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-43 (1988) (holding that
inspection of garbage left on street in opaque bags did not amount to constitu-
tional search because respondents had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
their garbage); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (holding that
Fourth Amendment was not violated by random searches of prison cells because
prisoners have no reasonable expectations of privacy in their cells).
229. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 528 (implying that prisoner has expectation of
privacy although it must always yield to "paramount interest in institutional
security").
230. For a discussion of the reasoning of theJones majority, see supra notes
165-92 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the "special needs" test, see
notes 58-62 and accompanying text. In fact, as of the time of this writing, one
other court has addressed the issue of the constitutionality of non-consensual
DNA testing of convicted felons. State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993)
(en banc). In Olivas, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the "special
needs" test was preferable to the approach of the Jones majority to this issue. Id.
at 1086. The court seemed to consider the constitutionality of these searches
already determined by prior case law, including Schmerber and Skinner, and de-
cided only the "approach" with which to reach this result. Id. at 1083-86, 1088.
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Courts considering the constitutionality of DNA database statutes
like the one at issue in Jones should also be cautious of allowing enthusi-
asm for new technology to override constitutional protections. Until fo-
rensic DNA testing has developed to the same level of reliability as
fingerprinting, courts should bear in mind both the potential usefulness
of DNA testing in solving future crimes and its technological limitations
in terms of the crimes DNA testing is likely to aid in solving.23 1 In addi-
tion, as DNA technology improves, and provides more information
about a suspect, the privacy interest compromised by DNA testing will
become even stronger. Thus, courts ought not to establish excessively
lenient standards authorizing testing.232
TheJones court correctly pointed out that the ideal forum for the
consideration of the concerns surrounding forensic DNA testing is the
legislature.233 Legislatures drafting statutes similar to the one consid-
ered in Jones should be extremely careful to distinguish violent from
non-violent felons. As Judge Murnaghan cogently argued in his dissent,
given the tenuous statistical link between non-violent felons and future
violent crimes it is only rational to draw a distinction between the
two. 23
4
Sheryl H. Love
231. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 314-15 (4th Cir.) (Murnaghan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing statistical evidence of util-
ity of forensic DNA testing and suggesting that Virginia's "DNA testing program
will prove, perhaps, ill-advised"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992). For a discus-
sion of the issues concerning the reliability of forensic DNA analysis, see supra
notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
232. GENETIC WrrNEss, supra note 2, at 113 (acknowledging concern of op-
ponents of DNA databases regarding expanded genetic testing).
233. Jones, 962 F.2d at 308 ("It is not for us to weigh the advantages of one
method of identification over another which is selected by the
Commonwealth.").
234. For a discussion of Judge Murnaghan's dissent, see supra notes 193-
210 and accompanying text.
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